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Abstract
Conflict surrounding the extraction and trade of natural resources is not an uncommon
phenomenon. Especially in the case of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which has
historically suffered from the negative impacts of the resource curse since their mineral wealth
was first discovered by their Colonial administrators. The importance of Congo’s minerals has
fluctuated over the years but has peaked during recent times, as their use in technological
advancements are becoming more vital. The global demand for these mineral ores have sky
rocketed and consequentially, the largely informal trade has benefitted certain rebel groups,
playing a pivotal role in the ongoing violence of Africa’s War. There have been many strategies
employed to break the tie between minerals and armed conflict in the DRC, yet violence is still
prevalent.
Despite the heightened media attention on the region, the development and enforcement
of new international regulations and the creation of industry-led initiatives to tackle the problem,
this issue continues to persist. This thesis attempts to understand why this is. It argues that the
dominant Western narrative on these minerals and its links to the ongoing violence is limited, as
it neglects the historical context of the onset of the fighting, as well as the voice of local miners
and grassroots organisations in formalisation efforts. I argue that this simplistic account and
understanding of the conflict, has impeded current efforts as it overlooks and fails to solve the
fundamental and underlying causes of the conflict. Ultimately, I trace the development of
Congo’s mineral sector and analyse case comparisons of the various legal mechanisms, initiatives
and schemes created in response to the growing demand for the conflict minerals, suggesting that
a more holistic and inclusionary bottom-up approach is required.
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Introduction
The struggle for access and control of natural resources has often played a large role in
the nature of armed violence since colonial times. An abundance of the resources is problematic,
especially in regions with weak institutional capacity, as it allows groups to compete for control
of them and then reap the rewards. The likelihood of resources leading to conflict is dependent
on whether extraction is labour intensive or capital intensive, as Dube and Vargas note, “the price
of natural resources (which are capital intensive) are positively related to conflict: when the price
rises, conflict rises”1 according to the regions that produce more natural resources. The
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) represents a situation where the labour-intensive
extraction of its precious metal ores, has been routinely manipulated by stronger parties in the
region for personal agendas. Without proper control over the sector, struggles over resource
governance have inadvertently contributed to and maintained a level of violence during the Great
Congo Wars.
In the case of the Congo, it is an extremely mineral rich state, with supplies of diamonds,
zinc, copper, cobalt and coltan. These precious metals in theory should give the Democratic
Republic of Congo a comparative advantage over other nations as they are relatively easy and
cheap to source, yet the revenue from the mineral trade rarely benefits the local population. The
‘Enough Project,’ an American NGO in 2009, popularized the plight of these Congolese miners2
and soon their campaign caught worldwide attention. In order to combat the stories of continuing
instability and injustices facing the Congo that the increased attention brought, there have been
many international, regional and local efforts established. Nevertheless, despite all these new
legal mechanisms and supply chain monitoring schemes developed, the problem continues to

1

Dube, O. and Vargas, J. (2013). Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from
Colombia. Pp.2-3
2
The Enough Project. (2017). Raise Hope For Congo - The Enough Project.
9

persist. This thesis seeks to evaluate why current efforts to improve resource governance in the
Congo have failed, as well as illuminate what these strategies have frequently missed.
For the past two decades, conflict and armed struggles have plagued the Democratic
Republic of Congo, which has facilitated an endless cycle of poverty and violence on the region.
Currently there are over 70 armed groups remaining active and the situation is highly complex.
For a country that has a history of unstable governance, corruption and ethnic hostilities
stemming from its colonial legacy and maintained by its successive leadership, this fragmentation
of armed groups is to be expected. Without any legal or accountability mechanisms, the
abundance of natural resources has attracted and financed many local and regional armed groups
into prolonging the conflict. The Eastern Congolese economy is highly dependent on the mineral
trade, with the sector contributing to around a fifth of the country’s GDP 3. Tin, Tungsten, and
Tantalum Ores and gold (3TGs) are mined across the region and are routinely sold and smuggled
through other countries to be processed into valuable metals. Coltan (the raw form of tantalum)
in today’s society is a highly-valued mineral, primarily due to its use in many modern-day
electronics. The demand for the mineral has seen unprecedented growth in the last few decades,
and with Congolese armed groups controlling some of these mines, along with other factors has
perpetuated an unstable climate for development in the DRC.
In 2009, a movement initiated by the influential NGO the Enough project, garnered huge
international attention and influenced many advocates to take up the cause. Advocates focused
much of their attention on the human rights abuses related to mining, including forced child
labour and sex slavery to help create awareness for the cause. While before this new-found
attention, conflict minerals seem like a distant problem; however, the campaign tied western
consumerism and technological advances, to the perpetuation of this issue in the Congo, turning
it into an accountability problem. By initiating a consumer driven movement, Obama’s

3

IMF (2015). Democratic Republic of the Congo. IMF Country Report. Pp. 20
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administration responded by adopting the 1502 Dodd-Frank Consumer Protection Act, which
requires companies that may be using conflict minerals, to register with the US Securities and
Exchange Commission and disclose full transparency of their supply chain. Yet as the legislation
was enforced in 2010, the effects on the ground are only now being felt and there is backlash on
its effectiveness. Recently, there has been a great debate that the law is now punishing the wrong
people, and the Trump administration is considering overturning the Dodd-Frank Act, especially
its conflict-free minerals component.4
The existing approaches to tackle the governance of minerals in Congo have been
unsuccessful in formalising the sector, primarily because they have overlooked fundamental
causes of the instability in the country. International and regional laws have been created and
applied in response to armed actor involvement in the mineral trade, however, it is clear now that
these have neglected to first understand the broader implications before coming into practice.
The premature application of global legal standards and the de facto ban that occurred in
response, was detrimental to those who depended on the DRC mineral trade, as their steady
livelihood strategy disappeared overnight. The sector became unpredictable thereafter, as the
Congolese government began amending their domestic laws to include new mining regulations
and natural resource management became a part of the regional political agenda. When these
efforts became limited in its scope, industries that use the 3T’s, companies and NGOs groups
across the globe, all took it upon themselves to solve the crisis in the Congo and began developing
their own governance strategies and due diligence schemes for ethical consumerism.
These various projects while set out with good intentions, have not been as effective as
one would have hoped mainly because they have been created and implemented with minimal
local involvement. While an international approach is helpful for an effective resource
governance, the lack of local knowledge and understanding of all the interlinking dynamics that

4

Rappeport, A. and Flitter, E. (2018). Congress Approves First Big Dodd-Frank Rollback. The
New York Times.
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effect the mining industry in Congo has hindered the progress of these campaigns. The majority
of current initiatives are primarily top-down approaches, designed by leading industry
organizations and governments, which have a narrow-minded and result orientated attitude
towards mineral governance. While this approach appeared successful for the case of ‘blood
diamonds’, a copy-paste solution of supply chain monitoring has not worked in the DRC as it
fails to address the localised underlying cleavages of conflict, such as ethnic frictions and land
rights.
With the story of Congo’s minerals being so pivotal and intricately tied in to Western
technological advancements, it is clear that we cannot just continue to fashion laws to solve such
a complex issue. While the link between technology, globalisation and conflict has been highly
publicised in modern media, there is a need for this to be academically researched and analysed.
This leads me to the basis of my paper, which aims to understand why resource conflicts,
particularly in the context of the DRC, continue to persist despite garnering worldwide
awareness, improvements in international law and increased stakeholder involvement in its
regulation. I wish to examine and unpack the unintended consequences of international
intervention and law implementation on the mineral trade of the Congo, especially in relation to
the Western technology sector. I argue that natural resource governance within the Congo is in
need of a more holistic approach to understand the conflict and is likely to be unachievable
without first rebuilding trust and transparency in the reigning state, as well as strengthening the
local governing structures tasked with this.
I seek to explore the issue of ‘conflict minerals’ and natural resource governance via a
comprehensive case-study of the Congo. Employing a historical and institutional analysis of the
nation and expansion of the mineral industry, by tracing the creation and development of these
key structures over time. I will conduct a case comparison of laws, treaties and other initiatives
designed to formalise the artisanal mining (ASM) sector in the country, by documenting both the
changes to laws and provisions which have stayed the same. My research process will trace the
12

various procedures over time, and evaluate the effectiveness of these schemes, in attempts to
recognise the short comings of current mining regulations. The weaknesses of international
mediation that are uncovered by this paper, I hope will provide insight into future theories of
high-valued resource governance in historically weak states.
This thesis begins by first introducing the leading aspects of the current literature on the
resource curse and its relationship to armed violence. I assess the role that natural resource wealth
has played in the past, and how these tie in to the narrative of the conflict in the DRC. The
literature review explores the rise of foreign accountability norms that have arisen due to
aggressive advocacy campaigns and summarise the various policy outcomes. Next, Section 1
will outline the story of conflict minerals through the Congolese account. Chapter 1 will dissect
the evolving nature of the conflict in the Congo. It will uncover the origins of the violence and
highlight the key sources of protracted instability throughout the region. This chapter will also
examine the influence of Congo’s colonial past in its development and regional volatility which
are equally responsible for the country we see today. Chapter 2 will then go on to trace the rise
of Congo’s mineral wealth, providing an opportunity for us to acquaint ourselves with the ores
that are the focus of the paper. It then follows the development of the ASM sector in the country,
emphasising the importance and use of these precious resources in the global context. Chapter 3,
still concentrating on the extraction and supply chain of the minerals, explores how a weak rule
of law and institutional capacity can easily trigger militarization of minerals and how it continues
to permit criminalisation of the trade. This includes current institutional pitfalls that has riddled
the Congo and its governing elites, despite improvements in domestic laws and creation of new
bodies to combat this.
I will then move into the second part of my paper where I will unpack how the topic came
into the international public sphere, how it was included on the political agenda for international
organisations, and the various initiatives created as a result of this heightened attention. It begins
with Chapter 4, which follows the rise of Congo’s mineral fame amongst the international
13

narrative, how it became such a ‘hot topic’, the birth and adoption of ethical consumerism and
why this issue in particular will continue to dominate headlines. Chapter 5 outlines and critically
evaluates one of the most famous pieces of legislation enacted by the Obama administration to
tackle this in 2010, the Section 1502 Dodd-Frank. Chapter 6 then seeks to outline the other
initiatives that have arisen as a result, whether it be industry driven, company enacted or
intergovernmentally agreed. I will then conclude my paper with a discussion on these strategies,
aiming to uncover the missing link between them and analysing the significance of such a broad
and fragmented approach in natural resource governance.

Literature Review
Between 2001 and 2013, a large body of literature examining the relationship between
natural resources and civil war has been explored by many academic researchers5. The term
‘resource curse’6 was first coined by the economist Richard M. Auty in 1993, as he noted that
countries with rich natural resources often tend to develop more slowly, with more violence,
corruption and with more authoritarian governments than others. This ironic phenomenon peaked
world-wide interest and caused many scholars to explore this relationship in greater depth and
with regards to different types of resources. Sachs and Warner7 build upon Auty’s theory and
introduces the notion of ‘Dutch Disease’, by which the discovering of natural gas reserves in
Holland, increased foreign currency reserves in the country and thereby the increased demand
for guilder (former currency). The change in demand thus strengthened the currency which led
to more expensive Dutch exports in the international market, rendering them uncompetitive and
negatively affected other parts of the economy. Additionally, there is also the insinuation that

5

Ross, M. (2015). What Have We Learned about the Resource Curse? Annual Review of
Political Science
6
Auty, R. (1993). Sustaining development in mineral economies: The Resource Curse Thesis.
pp.1
7
Sachs, J.D. and Warner A.M, (1997) “Natural Resource Abundance and Economic Growth.”
Working Paper for Center for International Development and Harvard Institute for International
Development.
14

countries with large amounts of resource wealth undergo less economic development or
innovation than those which are less reliant on the resource trade.
Collier and Hoeffler8 took the previous theories of the resource curse and built upon them
by examining the phenomenon in relation to civil conflict. The authors suggest that there is a link
between civil conflict and natural resource wealth, and their explanation for this relationship falls
into one of two categories. They state that natural resources such as oil and minerals, can lead to
war by either using profits to finance war or are the motive for civil war. The theory behind their
hypothesis is that natural resources that do not require a large amount of machinery for extraction
can be a great source of funding for armed groups as the industries tend to be location specific.
If rebels were to attack and extort money from other types of businesses, it is likely that they will
re-locate to an area more stable. Mineral and oil extraction however, are not able to move and so
rebels are able to extort these for a cut. Rebels are able to use the profits from this racketeering
to buy arms, hire soldiers and initiate a rebellion. The authors findings seem to confirm that
primary commodity exports substantially increase the risk of conflict, they attribute this
correlation to the resources proving opportunities for extortion which can be used to prolong
conflict and also acts as an incentive to engage in conflict.
Furthermore, another early argument made by the scholars in the natural resource- civil
conflict literature, explored the notion of resources creating a ‘grievance mechanism’ 9. This
suggests that the presence of natural resources create instability and unrest among the local
population surrounding the extraction by either disproportionate land expropriation,
environmental hazards, insufficient job opportunities or other social disruptions associated with
economic inequality. These factors suggest that injustice and inequality is enough of a motivator
to trigger violence and civil conflict around natural resource areas. However, this should mean
that armed groups target the resource sector and violence should be directed and contained

8

Collier, P. and Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford Economic
Papers
9
Ibid. pp.570
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towards these industries not prevalent throughout the country. Scholar’s following this line of
thought have so far, not proved this to be a very substantial basis of natural resource-conflict
theory.
Many subsequent studies have used Collier and Hoeffler’s initial ideas on the “looting
mechanism”10 and tested their theory in line with more recent conflicts as well as exploring the
relation of conflict to different types of natural resources. Some feel that those studying this topic
fail to recognise that civil war may have begun before the first act of violence has been
committed. There could have been many years of low-level hostilities prior to the civil war,
which may have indirectly contributed to the unstable environment allowing natural resource
extraction to be exploited in times of warfare. This includes studies on how civil war and resource
dependency could be caused by weak governmental, economic and legal systems. There have
been conflicting discourses on the role of governance and the exploitation of mineral resources.
Some academics11 view illegal natural resource exploitation as a by-product of frail
establishments, yet another theory is that the weak public infrastructure make the state dependent
on their natural resource exports. This reverse causality theory assumes that political power is
therefore hinged on the control of these resources, which in turn can act as an incentive for armed
groups who see natural resource control and political power as synonymous12. Hence, conflict
waged by armed militias in order to control these key resources were seen as an act of defiance
and political grievance. The control of minerals and other natural resources, therefore, become a
symbol of power, as it represented a vital source of the reigning government’s income which
could be wielded as a political bargaining chip.

10

Ross, M. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen
Cases. International Organization.
11
Cuvelier, J., Vlassenroot, K. and Olin, N. (2014). Resources, conflict and governance: A
critical review. The Extractive Industries and Society
12
Tsabora, J. (2014). Fighting The ‘Resource Wars’ in the Democratic Republic of the Congo:
An Exploratory Diagnosis of the Legal and Institutional Problems. The Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa
16

Other scholar’s such as Michael Ross note that there have been many disagreements over
the correlation between natural resource and conflict, especially in regards to which resources
are significant and which dimension they influence13. He notes that it is important to first
distinguish which mechanisms are at play as policies will depend on the role of natural resources
in the conflict. Ross uses the previous literature on natural resources and civil war in How do
natural resources influence civil war? Evidence from Thirteen Cases to examine which causal
mechanisms have been most significant over recent resource related conflicts. He explores nine
hypotheses relating to three suspected relationships; resource and the cause of conflict, resource
exploitation prolonging conflict and the intensity of war attributed to the accessibility of
resources. In his research, he confirms a connection between natural resource and conflict, but
also through examining thirteen different cases of conflict, he notes the resources seem to
contribute to the outbreak of conflict in ways unpredicted by the hypotheses. He finds that in the
two cases of conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1996 and 1997-1999), natural
resource wealth prolonged the conflict through the incentive method14. Ross recognised that the
continuation of conflict in the DRC was due to two previously unseen or overlooked mechanisms
in the standard literature, the emergence of a “booty future” market and the intervention of
foreign state actors in the conflict.
Foreign intervention and accountability is another aspect of conflict mineral literature
which has been heavily studied and publicised in recent times. The literature has progressed from
seeking to establish a link between conflict and minerals, towards a framework examining who
is responsible, determining the basis of my thesis. The contemporary dialogue now addresses the
many ways western states are adopting policies to address the issue of conflict minerals and
calling for their companies to become more transparent in their supply source of minerals. Norms
have arisen lately which promote foreign accountability to confront issues arising in resource-

13

Ross, M. (2004). How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from Thirteen
Cases. International Organization pp.36
14
Ibid. pp53
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led conflict areas abroad15. Advocacy groups and NGO’s have aimed to push companies to be
held more accountable and to conduct due diligence, hoping that information sharing will lead to
consumer condemnation and companies will act more responsibly. This push, in relation to
conflict minerals mined in the DRC has led to the 2010 adoption of article 1502 Dodd Frank in
U.S. legislation, which was largely a consequence of the Enough Project’s strategy paper, ‘Can
You Hear Congo Now? Cell Phones, Conflict Minerals, and the Worst Sexual Violence in the
World’16.
The rise of foreign accountability and the implementation of Dodd Frank has shown the
discourse in DRC’s conflict-mineral literature shift towards examining the repercussions of
foreign responses to problems abroad. There has been backlash on the legislation and western
advocacy efforts, as while enforced with good intentions, the effects of it on the ground are only
just being seen and felt. Nicknamed ‘Obama’s Law’17, the implementation in DRC is having very
negative unintended consequences. Another recent trend in the conflict mineral literature has
moved away from its role in civil conflicts and towards observing resource mining and its link
to human rights violations. As human rights issues have become more dominant in contemporary
political debates, many scholars have explored this link causing many advocacy groups to emerge
blaming western electronical companies as largely responsible. Researchers have discovered a
link between artisanal mining and the increase of rape in the DRC18, arguing that these abuses
have been permitted in mining regions which are largely militia controlled.

Partzsch, L. and Vlaskamp, M. (2016). Mandatory due diligence for ‘conflict minerals’ and
illegally logged timber: Emergence and cascade of a new norm on foreign accountability. The
Extractive Industries and Society
16
The Enough Project Team with the Grassroots Reconciliation Group (2009). A
Comprehensive Approach to Congo's Conflict Minerals.
17
Seay, L. (2012). What’s Wrong with Dodd-Frank 1502? Conflict Minerals, Civilian
Livelihoods, and The Unintended Consequences of Western Advocacy. Centre for Global
Development
18
Rustad, S., Østby, G. and Nordås, R. (2016). Artisanal mining, conflict, and sexual violence
in Eastern DRC. The Extractive Industries and Society
18
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The issue and abuses surrounding ‘conflict minerals’ has gained popular international
attention in the media in recent times, primarily after the 2002 war in DRC, which led to a
mountain of advocates and human rights lawyers from taking up the cause. Many NGO’s and
international organizations were created aiming to tackle this issue, following enough project’s
claim that those in the West were unknowingly perpetuating the conflict in the Congo and leading
to the death of many civilians. This claim was huge and eventually more protesting led to the
government adopting the 1502 Dodd Frank legislation. This was the turning point as we now 8
years later are finally realising the real implications of “Obama’s Law”. A critique of all these
evolving narratives on natural resources and conflict in the DRC, is that they fail to incorporate
the views of the current government and local actors. The recent debates on the resource curse
are too focused on the international aspect of pin pointing blame and responsibility in mineral
mining, that they fail to understand the global, regional and national interaction of the industry
and nature of the trade.
Understanding the nature of the resource curse itself is crucial and “thus, the investigation
and delineation of the role of law in tempering or preventing such resource curses is vitally
important given the emergence of new forms of legal institutions that directly regulate these
relationships”19. Similar to the issue of ‘Blood diamonds’, conflict minerals have garnered the
same media attention today, that The Kimberley Process was born from in 2000. Since its
implementation, the law has been referred to by some scholars, NGOs and governments as a
“model for the governance of other commodities for which there is significant inadvertent
funding of conflict”20. The Kimberley Process was founded from a push by leading civil rights
organisations, who were concerned about the damaging social effects of the ongoing illegal
diamond trade. Their campaigns and concern succeeded in getting the issue taken seriously by

19

Wexler, L. (2009). Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the
Blood Diamond Regime. Pp.1718
20
The World Bank (2018). Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, Natural Resources and Conflict: What
We Can Do, in Natural Resources and violent Conflict: Options and Actions. The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Pp.13
19

the international community, allowing it to be included on the 55th session of the UN General
Assembly in Kimberley, South Africa. They “recommended that the international community
develop detailed proposals for a simple and workable international certification scheme for
rough diamonds, based primarily on national certification schemes and on internationally
agreed minimum standards.”21
The Kimberley Process was therefore established as an international certification scheme
in an attempt to regulate the trade in ‘rough’ diamonds, that is diamonds that were believed to be
illegally mined by armed actors, financing wars against governments and linked to human rights
abuses. The process is unique in that it is not an international organisation or agreement, but it is
“implemented through the national legislations of its participants.”22 Today there are 54
participants, which represent 81 countries and claim to “actively prevent 99.8% of the worldwide
trade23”. Nevertheless, as the process is now actively running in its 17th year, there have been
many growing concerns and flaws recognised by experts and scholars alike.
Wexler24 is one scholar who examined the regulation of natural resources with particular
emphasis on the diamond certification process. He notes that there is a need to curb negative
effects of the resource curse as it often leads to “poor economic growth and vulnerability to
economics shocks, authoritarianism, corruption (and other forms of poor governance)”25 and civil
conflict. He highlights that natural resources are not just an issue for illegal mining by armed
actors, but also that the possibility of high rewards from such resources tempt those in positions
of power increasing corruption and discouraging democracy. Narrowing this down to the
diamond trade, he expresses that it is not only a singular state problem as many neighbouring

21

Shaik-Peremanov, N. (2014). Ten years on, the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and
Zimbabwe's Marange and 'Conflict diamonds': Lessons to be learnt. PER: Potchefstroomse
Elektroniese Regsblad pp.330
22
Kimberleyprocess.com. (2018). The Kimberley Process (KP).
23 Ibid.
24
Wexler, L. (2009). Regulating Resource Curses: Institutional Design and Evolution of the
Blood Diamond Regime.
25
Ibid. Pp.1723
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countries are also complicit, via smuggling or backing of militia-controlled mines. Exploring this
multi-faceted issue, he suggests that “when multiple states need to be regulated, a commodity
tracking system might provide a more sustainable approach.”26 With the successful involvement
of international NGO groups and organisations, Wexler concludes that “The Kimberley Process
provides compelling evidence to suggest that NGOs can simultaneously influence both states and
business cartels to address the problems posed by resource curses,”27 and how these “efforts can
be channelled into and through quasi-legal institutions.”28
As the Kimberley Process continues in its implementation, many other Scholars29 have
begun to realise its shortcomings in governing diamond trade and diminishing the associated
human rights violations. Shaik-Peremanov distinguishes that a major limitation with the
Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), is that it focuses mainly on “non-state actor
abuses while ignoring state and corporate abuses… [suggesting that] the international community
acts to deny resources to rebel groups regardless of the nature of the underlying conflict.”30
Additionally, viewing the scheme through a Zimbabwean case study, he suggests that it “risks
becoming irrelevant and ineffective if it adheres to a narrow interpretation of its original core
mandate and limits its human rights focus to human rights abuses committed by non-state
actors.”31
The history with the Kimberley Process is eerily similar to the backlash we are now
experiencing with the current laws governing conflict minerals in the US. There has been
growing concern to repeal the 2010 Dodd Frank legislation with the Treasury Department
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releasing a new report urging Congress to repeal several policies mandated by the 2010 law.32 It
is advocating to get rid of the provision which requires that companies disclose whether they use
"conflict minerals" acquired from the Democratic Republic of Congo and the surrounding region
afflicted by war. Like the KPCS, media outlets and academics alike are now realising and
understanding the true implications and unintended implications on the ground in the DRC.
Advocates of the Dodd-Frank believed that due diligence was a necessary step to combat
mineral-led conflicts, yet in hindsight it is clear that they failed to account for or offer support
for any possible negative repercussions. The announcement of the law in 2010 and the heightened
international media attention, generated mixed reviews and widespread confusion, but led to
other governments and industries scrambling to showcase their commitment to the cause.
Congo’s government immediately responded by enacting a six month ban on any Congolese
mineral exports between September 2010 and March 2011, and soon after the US Electronic
Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) created a de facto embargo by refusing to buy minerals
from the DRC that were not tagged as ‘conflict free’. The abrupt enforcement of these two
policies left a sixth of the country, whose livelihood depends on mining, without any other way
of generating income. Ironically in some cases, the lack of income alternatives for locals has
pushed them into join militia groups. While it’s true that in many mining areas the presence of
armed actors has decreased, but in other areas Congolese army officials have stepped in pushing
native miners off the land and keeping the profits for themselves. The embargo itself also did not
curb Congolese mineral exports as expected, instead bribery, extortion and smuggling increased,
pushing the trade it wished to formalise deeper underground. It is due to these adverse unforeseen
outcomes on the very local residents the legislation was aimed to protect, which has now caused
the new US administration to re-evaluate section 1502.
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This intervention into the literature and examination of the local dynamics of war are
imperative in understanding resource governance in the DRC, as their institutions and societal
barriers to formalisation have been shaped by their history. Yet, the existing literature and
explanations to the resource curse are unable to capture the complexity of the continuing violence
in the Congo, as. they do not account for the historical development of the trade, nor the local
dynamics of war. While the issue is primarily a domestic problem, there are multiple tiers which
need to be addressed simultaneously; that is the interaction between the village, regional and
national levels. The current approaches glance over indigenous cleavages such as ethnic disputes
and land rights, which has inherently lead to localised conflict. Moreover, there has been little
research conducted on the political economy of resource curse33, its relationship to political
accountability and the quality of domestic institutions. This thesis seeks to remedy these and
offer a contribution to the prevailing studies of the resource curse, through the Congolese context.
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo is unique, in that the resource wealth
has attracted many other players into the arena making it a very complex problem. I aim to
address this by examining conflict minerals through the lens of neighbouring countries and their
motives for getting involved in the ongoing ‘Africa’s War’, as well as, evaluating international
and technological involvement as the best way to help bring stability to the Congo. The topic is
growing in importance as the technology industry is rapidly expanding. With the sector
constantly advancing and finding new ways to be efficient, there is an urgent need for conflict
minerals to be thoroughly explored. With electric cars rumoured to be the next ‘big thing’, it is
now more important than ever to find a viable national and international solution to the regulation
of conflict minerals as the demand for cobalt is set to surge in the future. My paper therefore aims
to dissect the transforming role of conflict minerals in creating, prolonging and attracting foreign
intervention in the ongoing conflict in the DRC.
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SECTION 1: CONGO’S STORY
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Chapter 1: The Evolving Nature of Congo’s War
The great Congo war has been internationally portrayed as a power, land and resourceled struggle over control of the nation’s precious minerals. Yet while many attribute the conflicts
as being a by-product of the resource curse, blaming it on the very nature of the region, which is
a very narrow-minded interpretation. There are so many underlying internal battles and hostilities
contributing in some way to the violence, which are imperative to understand before we can
analyse the role of minerals amidst this. Fighting in Congo’s war has been prevalent since the
1990’s. Now over 25 years on, it is not impractical to assume that the nature and cause of war
has changed dramatically over the years, however, the fundamental causes of conflict still remain
unaddressed. What makes the Congolese war different from any other conflict of the continent,
is the vast number of actors and armed groups regionally and domestically involved.
The continuation of the war itself today, has “no overarching narrative or ideology to
explain it”34, but yet involves many ordinary people fighting as combatants for numerous causes.
It leads us to question the motives behind these groups and what the core disputes are primarily
about. Throughout this section, I argue that in contrast to the dominant global narrative of Congo
and its minerals; local disputes over land, ethnicity and identity construction have had a crucial
part to play in the onset of violence tormenting the Democratic Republic of Congo today, whose
formation and role is best understood through a historical analysis. I then go to explore how these
small-scale disputes have tended to get swept under the carpet and overlooked during
peacebuilding efforts, which left unresolved, have had the capacity to develop into full blown
regional conflicts.
Colonialism
Congo’s ongoing war is multifaceted and multi-layered, the violence has swelled and
expanded into containing wars within wars. Nevertheless, the persistent instability of the DRC
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and the surrounding region is not a new phenomenon, it has deep seeded roots from its historical
rule and has been cultivated by its unequal development. Congo has explicitly been plagued by
a pattern of exploitation and authoritarian rule stemming from its colonial era under King
Leopold II. Leopold claimed Congo for himself in 1885, launching the Congo Free State directly
under his control. He ruled as a dictator until 1908, where the nation was then sold over to Belgian
rule. The colonial empire founded administration and was also pivotal for the establishment of
the mining industry in Congo, as they focused their attention to extracting resources from the
country. Like most colonial rulers of the time, the Belgian’s maintained a realm of segregation
amongst the local administration, ensuring white supremacy overpowered the elites.
The Belgians were also somewhat responsible for the now apparent and significant
friction between the Congolese population and those of Rwandan heritage in the nation. During
their reign, the Belgian government focused their attention on extracting rubber and minerals
from the DRC and were in desperate need of labourers to meet their demands. Between 19371957 they imported around 175,000 Rwandans under the ‘Mission d’Immigration des
Banyarwanda35, having always admired them for their hardworking spirit. Following the
disruption during Rwanda’s independence, a further 100,000 more fled into the country and by
1970, Rwandans living in Congo “made up over 70 percent of the population”36 in the Masisi
region. Land was taken and expropriated to the foreigners and soon “Hutu farmers and Tutsi
ranchers came to dominate the local economy”37. Furthermore, the colonizers assigned the higher
administrative positions to those with Rwandan ancestry than the indigenous Congolese
community, giving them access to more political and economic power. This undoubtedly led to
the foundation of some tensions between the newcomers and the local Congolese Hunde
community who had lived there for generations, which would later play a pivotal role in the wars
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that followed. The uneasy relationship was further aggravated in the years following Congo’s
Independence, due to the questionable governing tactics of Congo’s next kleptocratic leader.
Mobutu Rule – 1965 – 1997
The authoritarian rule of President Mobutu Sese began when the Belgian colonial reign
ended in 1960, and the intermediary leader, Patrice Lumumba, was ousted in 1965 by a joint
CIA-backed coup. Mobutu’s leadership drove the country into economic chaos, developing
policies which hindered economic development, encouraged corruption and benefitted political
elites while thwarting any potential political rivals. The strength of the Congolese state and its
institutions declined during Mobutu’s presidency, leaving the country largely to fend for itself.
He misdirected funding and resources away from the army and public establishments, which
heavily stifled the growth and development of the nation. Despite robbing the country to satisfy
his own personal agenda, Mobutu was able to maintain his hold on the country for thirty-two
years, renaming the country Zaire in 1971. His regime weakened all governing bodies,
diminished the rule of law throughout the nation and aggravated ethnic tensions, setting up a
perfect storm of conditions which allowed the administration to crumble when a disturbance in
the neighbouring country of Rwanda permeated into the DRC.
Rwandan Genocide – 1994
Restlessness amongst the Eastern side of the DRC was primarily triggered by and
flourished during 1994, whereby the spill over effects from the genocide occurring in Congo’s
smallest neighbour, sparked a huge humanitarian crisis in the region. The vast repercussions of
the ethnic cleansing crossed the border into the Congo, as over a million Hutu’s, civilians and
militia men fled the bloodshed. Congo experienced the continuation and extension of the
Rwandan civil war, as the Rwandan armed forces (FAR), a predominantly Hutu militia group,
allegedly used the border as protection to regroup and devise attacks back in their home soil.
Fighting amongst the border continued as fleeing Rwandan’s set up camps in Goma and around
Lake Kivu which were a mere few miles away from their home territory. Refugee settlements
27

unexpectedly grew along the border, which were largely ill managed and ill equipped to handle
the sheer numbers fleeing to safety.
The biggest dilemma and destabilizing feature to Eastern Zaire during this time came
from the endangerment caused by Rwandan militia men, who camouflaged themselves amongst
civilians in refugee camps. This threat alone maintained a constant air of violence and insecurity
in the region, while political elites in Kinshasa either underestimated the risks posed by this or
had no interest in mediating nor dissipating the danger. This allowed Paul Kagame, Rwanda’s
new leader, to use this to his advantage and as justification for the consequent invasions of the
refugee camps by his army. The militarization of the refugee camps provided globally acceptable
‘just’ cause for the consequential attacks in eastern Zaire, as the Rwandan army invaded the
region and provided support for Congo’s anti-Mobutu movement led by the rebel group, Alliance
for Democratic Liberation (AFDL).
The mass forced displacement of refugees and armed rebels alike into the Congo,
exacerbated local grievances that were festering prior to the crisis. Local ethnic tensions were
bubbling, due to the influx of Hutu’s into a predominantly Tutsi area. In the months following
the genocide, Mobutu was seen by the region as supporting the FAR over the Rwandan Patriotic
Front (RPF) who were in power in Kigali. His allegiance to the FAR was primarily down to the
close personal friendship he had with Habyarimana, Rwanda’s former president, before his plane
was shot down under mysterious circumstances. As the warfare waged on, Mobutu’s loyalty and
partnerships with Western allies and militia groups angered his neighbours. Throughout the mid1990s, many African leaders grew to dislike and distrust Mobutu. He was viewed as supporting
their enemies, refusing to separate soldiers from the refugees, and also failed to use his diplomatic
position to negotiate an understanding. Nation heads of Uganda, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Eritrea,
Ethiopia and Tanzania were unified by their common hatred for the Congolese dictator, making
it easy for Kagame and his Ugandan ally, President Yoweri Museveni, to launch a regional quest
to overthrow Mobutu.
28

Ethnicity and a sense of national identity when directed and contorted by political elites,
has played a huge role in conjuring up violence not just in the Congo, but all over Africa. It was
a tactic used to maintain control during the Colonial administration, and for the case of Rwanda,
racial prejudices were exacerbated by a popular rhetoric convincing the dominant Hutu
population that the Tutsi minority would soon become a threat if nothing was done. Similarly in
the Congo, as Mobutu’s power was declining throughout the 80’s, he conjured up old grievances
and ethnic hostility in attempts to maintain his hold on the presidency. The DRC has had an
overwhelming history of violence, suspicion and scapegoating manipulated by leaders to
maintain and generate support. Particularly, Mobutu’s continual mistreatment of the
Banyamulenge, a small Tutsi community that settled previously in Zaire, fostered an anti-Tutsi
sentiment in the country which he used to enhance his popularity. The Banyamulenge group and
other members of Rwandan descent were mainly spread out in the Southern Kivu province,
leading to instability throughout the region in 1981, when Mobutu publicly reversed the blanket
citizenship law, ten years after its implementation. This created hostility between the indigenous
residents and the newly branded immigrants, many of which had settled in the area for
generations.
Additionally, this political manoeuvre was acutely risky as tensions between the varying
ethnicities were heightening across the entire region. Both Rwanda and Burundi at the time were
also going through their own clashes between their Hutu and Tutsi populations. Therefore,
ostracising the ‘alien settlers’ due to their Rwandan heritage triggered many of the youths to join
the RPF rebellion in Rwanda, further reinforcing the divide in Congo once the battle progressed
over the state boundary. The Kivus region felt the full impact of the Rwandan civil war, as the
fighting transpired into the locality “driving a wedge between communities.”38
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Congo War I – 1996-1997
Anti-Tutsi ideology was at the forefront of most of the violence erupting in 1996, as the
“successive leaders on both sides of the ethnic divide have only cynically fanned these flames.”39
Ethnic prejudice flourished, partly due to the poor economic conditions rampant under Mobutu.
Congo faced low economic development, poverty, rising inflation and inequality, which provided
fertile terrain for racial discrimination to act as a scapegoat. The autocrat’s strategy of divide and
conquer worked well up until his paranoia eventually overtook his judgement. Mobutu’s mistrust
in his own officers led him to misdirect resources away from the national army, instead funding
separate paramilitary units. He “cannibalised his own state” and kept the army weak, which
largely enabled the success of the 1996 invasion by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Congo-Zaire (AFDL). Many Congolese welcomed the insurgency, tired of the
conditions under Mobutu’s selfish rule, refer to this as the ‘War of Liberation’. The army
commanded by low-level officers, who inherited the position after independence, crumbled under
the invasion. They were decaying from years of being under funded and ill equipped, causing
many to defect, selling whatever supplies they could muster. The AFDL rebels, spearheaded by
Laurent Kabila arrive in Kinshasa on May 17th, 1997 seizing control of the state, yet he is only
able to hold on to power for a year before Congo’s Second War beings.
Congo War II – 1998-2003
Kabila’s previous close ties with the region deteriorated during his presidency, his former
allies Rwanda and Uganda became alienated. Feeling threatened, he too stirred the ethnic
hostility pot, reviving the anti-Tutsi sentiment and causing Rwanda to retaliate to their defence.
Rwanda’s government, expressed that they only invaded Congo in 1998 to pursue those behind
the Rwandan genocide, who they believed were hiding out across the border. The conflict ensued
until 2003, by which it had escalated to become Africa’s War, earning “its name because at the
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height of the war eight African nations and over 25 militias were in the combatant mix”40. Due
to varying causes the region was split; Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi against Angola, Namibia,
Chad, Zimbabwe and Congo. Kabila’s repressive command frustrated a large majority of his
citizens, glad to be rid of the former dictator, his replacement seemed to be no different. There
was little economic development in the months following Kabila’s inauguration, causing a
number of ordinary people to become combatants and join one of the many groups in the
resistance. It is here, during Congo’s second war, where the mineral resource abundance of the
nation became more apparent and is linked to financing the violence. Rebel groups controlled
large parts of fertile mining territory and for most of the states involved, “economic interests
played a role but were woven into a complex web of domestic and regional, political and
corporate considerations”41. In a large number of cases, mining heads signed deals with the rebels
over the government, transitioning the trade into an informal economy. The incapacity and
absence of the relevant authorities in these areas allowed the markets to operate outside the sphere
of influence, and also left local disputes between chiefs, ethnic groups and disagreements over
land rights to fester, ultimately destabilising any attempts at natural resource governance.
Between 1999 and 2003 there were numerous attempts at a peace negotiation, with rebels
profiteering off the persistent instability. The Lusaka ceasefire agreement, was signed by the
heads of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe in 1999. Yet its
failure to halt the fighting, caused the UN Security Council to establish MONUSCO (Mission de
l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation en République démocratique du Congo),
which is “the UN’s largest and most expensive peacekeeping operation”42 for the Congo. Some
warlords built rebel movements and controlled large parts of territory during this time, using
political motivations as a smokescreen for their mineral wealth gains. For politicians and states
involved, “economic interests played a role but were woven into a complex web of domestic and
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regional, political and corporate considerations.”43 Kabila was rumoured to have struck many
deals in the area, using mines and resources to finance the war, trading them for military
assistance. Similarly, Rwanda and Uganda have been condemned for doing the same during their
occupation of Eastern Congo, using their takings to fund operations. This is the narrative that
soon came to dominate western media’s understanding of the second war, stories of mineral
exploitation, rape and murder in the Congo which brought attention to the plight of Congolese
miners, but over simplified the root origins of the fighting.
Achieving peace during this time was always going to be a turbulent mission. Congo
faced weak and corrupt governance led by elites, seeking to fulfil their personal agendas above
the nations. Its institutions and infrastructure were failing due to the onset of violence, which
hindered any potential investment and development. Additionally, the continued volatility over
decades in the region, had created a huge refugee and internal displacement strain on DRC’s
economy, which policymakers manipulated into aggravating ethnic tensions. These issues were
made even more difficult by the conventional ‘top-down’ peacekeeping approach adopted by
international actors in attempts to remedy the war. Head way was seen to be made after Joseph
Kabila took power following Laurent Kabila, his father’s assassination in 2001. His style of
governance immediately differed from his predecessor’s, by resuscitating the stalled peace
process and seemingly eager to comply with the UN.
Transitioning towards peace & democracy – June 2003-Dec 2006
Once Joseph Kabila came into power, he ousted and replaced almost the entire cabinet
that governed alongside his father and began focusing on pleasing the international ties
previously neglected. Starting in 2002, inter-Congolese dialogue was facilitated between political
parties and the various rebel factions but excluded some Rwandan affiliated groups. By the end
of 2002 due to international pressure, Rwanda and Uganda both withdrew their troops from
Congo and a regional settlement to set up a transitional government in the DRC was reached.

43

Stearns, J. (2011). Dancing with monsters. New York: PublicAffairs. Pp.285
32

They agreed that the new transitional government would share power between the former
government and rebels, with democratic elections vowed to be held within two years after
enactment. This was sworn into action in July 2003, where Joseph Kabila was affirmed as the
new provisional president, splitting the power between four vice-presidents, of which two were
former rebel leaders44.
Maintaining peace and control during this transition period was still a bumpy road. There
were still pockets of interim fighting and conflict persisting throughout the nation, despite
reaching national and regional deals. Joseph Kabila faced three main threats to peace during this
time; General Laurent Nkunda who launched a rebellion in the Kivus region, the Bas-Congo
Province in Western Congo, who were rallying for the right to self-determinate, and those loyal
to former vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba. As aforementioned, it is clear that disagreements
and grievances at the local level easily fed into larger conflicts that had the potential to undermine
peace keeping efforts. Additionally, it was not helped by Joseph Kabila’s response to the various
challenges as he reacted with unproportioned brutal force, echoing the repressive regime
experienced at the hands of Congo’s former leaders.
Nevertheless, on gaining power Joseph Kabila’s commitment to democracy remained
strong, he held ‘free and fair’ elections in 2006, eventually winning the presidency in the run-off
voting with “58 percent of the national vote”45. He was sworn in again as president on December
2006 and began incorporating warlords and many armed groups into the national army. Yet his
main opponent, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was openly very critical of Kabila’s governance following
his defeat, and he accuses Kabila of vote rigging. Tensions between the supporters of both parties
remained high, especially as there were sporadic events of violence directed towards Bemba’s
camp in the lead up to the deciding election. Additionally during this political turbulence, Laurent
Nkunda, a Tutsi rebel leader in North Kivu supposedly backed by Rwanda, defected from joining
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the national army as agreed upon, instead choosing to fight them and expand his territory. His
rebel troops, a part of the CNDP (Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) maintained their
arms worried about Kabila’s support of the Rwandan Hutu forces FDLR (Forces Démocratiques
de Liberation du Rwanda) against them. As illustrated, ethnic based hostility is one of the main
causes of the continuation of violence during this transitionary period and were detrimental to
any attempts at peaceful negotiations.
Local Ethnic Rivalries and Land Disputes
Much of the recent violence in the DRC “has been driven by local grievances exacerbated
by uncertainty at the national level.”46 Ethnic rivalries and tension in the DRC have
predominantly occurred between the indigenous Congolese community and those of Rwandan
descent. It has been fostered by society and intensified by politics and rights of citizenship. The
origins of this can be traced back to colonial rule, particularly the Belgian Mission for the
Immigration of the Banyarwanda. As mentioned previously, tens of thousands of Rwandan’s
were imported into Congo by the colonisers, to provide the state with labour for mining and
working on plantations. The Banyarwanda, a name now associated with all people with Rwandan
ancestry, were favoured by the ruling elites. They were given authoritative roles in administration
and special privileges, that were otherwise denied to the native Congolese. Friction between the
two groups heightened following Congolese independence in 1960, as indigenous communities
sought to re-establish their control of their territory. The Banyarwanda were stripped of their land
and political power, using their lack of citizenship as just cause, which lead to the 1963 war of
Kanyarwanda; “the first open conflict between Banyarwanda and indigenous Congolese.”47
The divide in Congolese society was furthered by Mobutu’s partisan treatment of the
Banyarwanda during his presidency. He supported and favoured ethnic minorities as a way to
maintain his popularity without chancing a potential threat. Similar to the colonial regime, he too
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promoted individuals of Rwandan lineage into top governmental positions, enabling them to push
policies that promoted the interests of their community. Blanket citizenship was granted to
Rwandans in 1972 to those who came to Congo before 1950, and in 1973, the general property
law increased the territory under Banyarwandan control. These legislations heavily changed the
dynamics of the region as citizenship enabled Banyarwandan’s to become the majority in some
areas, increasing their economic, social and political influence over some main districts.
However, this was short lived. In 1972, citizenship was revoked and only “those who
could prove that their families were in Congo before 1885”48 maintained their rights. There was
widespread distrust and fear throughout the country, hostility was maintained between the native
Hunde groups and the ‘immigrants’ through complaints of corruption and access to political
forums. Additionally, tension grew between the Hutu and Tutsi’s within the Banyarwanda
community loosely reflecting the ongoing disturbances between the groups in Rwanda and
Uganda. Micro-level conflicts spread from province to province, peaking during the Rwandan
genocide. To Congolese nationals, the split in Banyarwanda Hutu’s and Tutsi’s was
advantageous, presenting them with an opportunity to exploit this friction to solidify their stance
in the provinces. Low-level incidents of violence between the two groups erupted in 1991,
multiplying to engulf all of North Kivu by 199349. Local conflicts such as this soon became large
enough to be self-sustaining and autonomous, destabilising the region for extended periods of
time.
Land scarcity and distribution is another factor fuelling low level conflicts in the DRC as
over time, legitimate claims to the land have become skewed and it is hard to distinguish the
rightful owner. Due to the very little bureaucracy and functioning state systems in place, there is
little evidence to support these assertions. Despite the sheer size of the Congo, land is extremely
valuable as it provides opportunities and sustainability for people’s livelihood. Owning land not

48

Autesserre, S. (2010). The Trouble With the Congo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Pp. 137
49
Ibid. Pp. 141
35

only provides agricultural prospects but also mineral wealth, crucial to farmers and miners alike
for making a living. Land was politicised during Mobutu’s reign, as he bestowed land to groups
and officers as a reward for loyalty, especially in the Kivus region where land is especially
valuable. This is also somewhat responsible for adding to the ethnic tensions mounting in the
province too, as many Banyarwandans were given land that was taken away from customary
chiefs. The problems surrounding identity construction and citizenship also became a lot more
prized, as identity determined access to land and other benefits.
Local agendas have really influenced Congolese history and “have been intertwined with
macro-level dimensions”50. With the vast size of Congo comparable to the land mass of Eastern
Europe, it is no wonder that it has faced so many secessionist and separationist attempts by
various states and provinces. In 1960, the Eastern Katanga province launched a movement to
detach itself from the Congo state and maintain the spoils from its rich copper wealth. The leaders
responded with force and brutality as they deemed it as a challenge to their power, the fighting
subsided, but the animosity remained.
Ongoing Congo War III – 2008
Eventually with all the violence transpiring between the many combatants, a peace deal
was negotiated and signed in January 2008 between the government and 22 armed groups,
including the political armed militia group CNDP established by Nkunda. Yet this is short lived
as by July, both sides have engaged in violent clashes against each other and thus, the third Congo
War begins. Nkunda and the CNDP movement magnifies, now with the purpose of overthrowing
Kabila’s administration. Furthermore, there is continual and unresolved encounters with the
Ugandan Rebel group LRA (Lord’s Resistance Army) in northern Congo. A second election was
held in 2011, but due to multiple claims of fraudulence in the electoral process and growing
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dissatisfaction with Kabila’s rule, the result is widely disputed and it was unclear as to who the
legitimate winner was51.
The foundations behind the persistent fighting during this time reflect a number of
varying causes and ideologies. It is now deemed as one of the largest humanitarian crisis of all
time52 by UN chief Antonio Guterres, with huge numbers of human rights violations occurring
in recruitment and during insurgencies, with almost all rebel groups and parties complicit.
Unnecessary mass killings, reports of rape, recruitment of child soldiers and mineral exploitation
are amongst the main components of the lens that international communities view the war raging
in the Congo, prompting a global response despite many unobvious civil, political and economic
motivating factors.
Current Situation
Currently in the DRC, President Joseph Kabila’s term officially ended in 2016. But his
refusal to step down and delaying of elections has permitted him to still be in office today. He is
accused of reinterpreting the constitution wrongly, arguing that with no presidential elections,
the president in office is permitted to remain in power indefinitely53. The international
community has largely overlooked and ignored the obvious rule breaking, despite getting
involved in a similar case in Ivory Coast. It leads us to question, why is Congo undeserving of
international pressure? Jason Stearns, a former coordinator of the UN DRC Group of Experts has
noted that nature of DRC’s violence is somewhat different to that experienced in current times.
The root causes are extremely complex yet they are often interrelated, “with conflicts sitting
inside conflicts sitting inside conflicts”54. Therefore, it is no wonder that with such a weak
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government, rule of law and institutional capacity, how civil conflicts have been allowed to fester
until reaching a national or regional outbreak. By the time peacekeepers can intervene, the
situation has tended to progressively worsen beyond mediation. This vital flaw in Congo’s
governance and its lack of effective accountability mechanisms has enabled and essentially
maintained the exploitation of its natural resource wealth for generations.
The fundamental causes of Congo’s unending conflict as outlined in this section, is
multifaceted and has little to do with its natural resource deposits. The majority of the large-scale
disputes have their roots primarily derived from ethnic rivalries and disagreements over land
ownership, stemming from the Colonial era. These antagonisms have been skilfully manoeuvred
by political elites and have been instrumental in shaping the governance of Congo’s natural
resources. Subsequently, we cannot seek to understand how resources are managed without fully
understanding the historical and institutional context. Examining the local dynamics in mineral
rich regions of the country are essential to wholly comprehend all the interconnected factors of
the industry, and motivations behind the strategies developed to control them.

Chapter 2: The Rise of Mineral Wealth
The DRC’s natural resource wealth has been apparent since their colonial rule in 1908,
where the “Belgian colonial administration rapidly established and developed industrial, largescale mining (LSM) during the first half of the twentieth century,”55 searching for copper, tin and
gold. In 1906, the Belgian government gave the ‘Société générale de Belgique’, a company
closely linked to the state, a 99-year monopoly on mining rights of 13,000 square miles of mining
tract in Katanga56. The Société générale, was responsible for creating three powerful companies
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under them; Upper Katanga Mining Union which was later nationalised by Mobutu in 1967, the
Bas-Congo to Katanga Railroad Company and the International Forest and Mining Company.
LSM eventually declined when the nation gained independence in and the Belgian mining
companies were nationalized under President Mobutu.
Artisanal mining (ASM), that is small-scale “mining by hand,”57 has had a long history
in the DRC. It first began in the early 1970’s, with participation heightening following its
legalization in 1983. It is currently defined in the 2002 DRC Mining Code as:
“any activity by means of which a person of Congolese
nationality carries out extraction and concentration of mineral
substances using artisanal tools, methods and processes, within
an artisanal exploitation area limited in terms of surface.”
ASM became a livelihood strategy for many due to the minimal need of machinery and
easy processes of extraction. It grew in popularity when the largest state-owned mining company,
Gécamines, collapsed during the 1990s58, and is now regarded as “one of the most important
forms of employment in the DRC”59. When President Mobutu Sese Seko seized power in 1965,
he nationalised the mining industry, creating the state mining company, Générale des Carrières
et des Mines S.A. which was a rebranding of the former Upper Katanga Mining Union. However,
he strategically placed family and friends in charge of governing its activity. The corrupt
structures of power he developed to control Congo’s natural resources, allowed his inner circle
and select elites to embezzle billions through the trade. The president used the mining company
to finance his personal wealth, as well as fund his patronage networks, forcing all mineral exports
to be sold through a state mineral board. During its peak in the 1970s and 80s, the Gécamines
was the largest source of employment and income in the country, it “employed some 34,000
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workers, ran farms, hospitals and schools for their benefit, and was the largest contributor to the
state treasury”60.
When Mobutu’s rule collapsed in 1990, as did the functionality of the Gécamines and the
company began dissipating as a result of this and in conjunction with plunging world copper
prices. Additionally, the rising instances of violence around the industry caused many expert staff
to desert the company, causing severe managerial and production problems. Following this
decline, Mobutu encouraged his prime minister, Kengo Wa Dondo, to begin privatising the
mining sector in 1995, as the function of the official economy was coming to an alarming halt.
The nature of mining operations throughout the Congo has changed drastically over the
last few decades. What started as large-scale industrial operations, operated by a single company
and usually involving heavy machinery, is now controlled by groups of Congolese and
international firms, with artisanal mining continuing in parallel. In 1999 Mobutu’s replacement,
Laurent Kabila, took steps to restore order to the mining sector, by establishing The Service
d’Assistance et d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM), a government body to
oversee the industry. In an attempt to regulate and effectively harness the royalties from the
mining sector, the government along with civil society and industry participants61 developed and
published a new mining code in 2002, hoping to attract foreign investment. The code established
special zones, “Zones d’exploitation artisanale (Artisanal Mining Zones or ZEAs) where
industrial or semi-industrial mining is not viable”62. This enticed many Chinese and western
mining companies to capitalise and take over former Gécamines sites. Yet due to a substantial
lack of these ZEA sites country-wide the majority of mining is conducted informally.
The main minerals mined in the DRC are the 3TGs; Coltan, Tin, Tungsten and Gold. The
importance and demand of each mineral has fluctuated dramatically over the years primarily in
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line with trending technological and electronic advancements. Below is a table of the minerals
ores regarded as ‘conflict minerals’ and sourced from the DRC, their refined product and uses.
Table 1 – Minerals Mined in the DRC, Facts and Figures

Mineral Ore

Refined
Product

Casserite

Tin

% of world
production in
DRC
6-8%64

Coltan
(ColumbiteTantalite)

Tantalum

15-20%65

Wolframite

Tungsten

2-4%66

Gold

-

>1%

Primary Uses

Main
Location/Provinces63

Solder, Cans,
Automotive Parts

Manemia (Kalima,
Kailo, Lubutu)
North Kivu (WalikaleBisie Mine), South Kivu
(Kalehe Terrirtoy),
Katanga
Capacitors, Alloys,
Katanga (Manono,
Glass, Memory
Kisengo, Sango) North
Chips
Kivu (Masisi) and South
Kivu
Air & Spacecraft, Maniema (Kailo), South
filaments
Kivu
Jewellery, Wiring
Maniema, Katanga,
North and South Kivu,
Ituri

General Mining Supply Chain
Mining strategies adopted and the tools required vary upon the various minerals
themselves, however, sourcing the 3TG’s in the DRC is typically undertaken via artisanal and
small-scale methods. The simplicity and accessibility of ASM mining techniques is what caused
it to gain popularity in Congo during the coltan rush, as well as offering civilians one of the
largest employment opportunities since the decline of the agricultural sector. Despite being a
largely informal market with little governmental oversight, the production of minerals is
somewhat organized favouring micro-investments. Generally speaking, the supply chains begin
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with the miners, creuseurs as they are locally called, who extract mineral ores. The miners obtain
the resource by using inexpensive tools, often by hand or using very basic tools such as shovels,
chisels, hammers and picks to search for the ores typically in make-shift mines. The rocks
containing the precious mineral ores are then washed, sifted and sorted, often by women and
children, before they sell their loot to traders or intermediaries. Water is a large and necessary
component of the extraction process as it is required to separate the ores from the dirt and other
components form the grounds. With little oversight governing proper mining procedures,
constructing mines has numerous negative environmental effects, which erode the agricultural
properties of the land and include deforestation, soil erosion and is detrimental to the wildlife.
Although the chain is very labour intensive, global demands for the minerals ensure that small
quantities of the minerals bear high rewards.
The minerals are then transferred usually by hand, as mines tend to be geographically
secluded, to local ‘négociants’ middle men. The négociants are typically situated in small towns
and are the creseurs only access to the market. The minerals may travel through numerous
négociants, before eventually being purchased by a mineral trading firm known as comptoir,
which markets the spoils to larger companies. These trading hubs are usually situated in large
towns, scattered throughout the eastern border and are more politically powerful, purchasing
minerals at prices set by them. They maintain their purchasing power as they are a major source
of revenue for the relative authorities. Here the precious stones are sorted and processed before
being traded with global mineral trading firms. These trade deals are often based on long term
pre-agreed contracts based on price and quantity. However, for the case of coltan, the mineral
can also be sold via spot markets which are open and facilitated by specialist broking firms. The
prices fluctuate freely and are advantageous to the négociants as the transaction and payment is
immediate. At trading houses, the minerals are mixed with others from all over the world and are
processed by plants mainly in Europe, Asia and North America into components, which are used
to manufacture the final end products such as mobile phones and other hand-held electronics.
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Figure 3: General Mineral Supply Chain in the DRC

Coltan
ASM particularly grew in popularity and significance during Kabila’s reign and the
Second Congo War (1998-2003), where neighbouring countries conspired with Congolese rebels
to overthrow the newly appointed leader. Kabila began cracking down on large foreign
companies when he gained power and encouraged locals to mine for their livelihood as he saw
little scope of reviving the mining industry. It is here where the importance and desirability of
columbite-tantalite, a black metallic abbreviated to coltan, entered into effect. Raw coltan has
found its worth through the digital age, as its presence in technology is becoming increasingly
common at the expense of the locals who mine it. It is often mined in the DRC through ASM and
small-scale methods, in order to meet shifting demand. After refinement, the ore is processed
into a faded blue powder named tantalum which is used in many handheld technological devices
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due to its many multi-functional properties. Tantalum is primarily used in the production of
capacitors, it is a great conductor of electricity, has a high melting point and only small amounts
are required67. The international price of Tantalum has fluctuated along with global demand,
experiencing two sharp prices spikes in 1980 and 2000, seeing its demand peak during the release
of SONY’s PlayStation console mid-200068. Coltan found its fame during this time, where many
journalists linked it to warlords and the ongoing violence in DRC. The increased attention that
Coltan drew, fuelled the surge in advocacy efforts and campaigns directed towards the region.
Technology Boom
The boom of mineral wealth in eastern DRC really materialised hand-in-hand with the
rise of global technological developments. As the world is getting more conscious about
renewable energy and creating reusable products to limit waste, people are starting to rely on
rechargeable batteries. Cobalt is a crucial component in these lithium-ion rechargeable batteries,
which is required for many portable electronic devices such as phones, laptops, tablets and
electric cars. In the current climate, “more than half of the world’s total supply of cobalt comes
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo”69, with 20% of this cobalt coming from creuseurs
(artisanal miners) in the southern region. The majority of the time the product moves through a
variety of routes, it ultimately ends up in the possession of Congo DongFang International
Mining70 (CDM), a subsidiary Chinese company to Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Company Ltd.
(Hauyou Cobalt) and one of the largest cobalt producers in the world. CDM has been operating
in Congo since 2006, they buy cobalt from traders, who buy directly from the miners. CDM
smelts the ore at their site in the DRC before exporting it to their other smelting plants in China
before they are sold to battery manufacturers.
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Regulation
Nowadays, the sheer scale of artisanal mining is astounding, with recent estimates
suggesting that 20% of DRC’s exported cobalt is mined by 110,000 miners in Katanga 71. The
rise of mineral wealth in the nation has drawn a huge number of locals to the industry. There is
“an estimated 750,000 to 2,000,000 artisanal miners in the DRC,”72 but it has also attracted
criminalization and corruption, which currently runs rampant throughout the mineral trade in
DRC. Domestic and international pressures in reaction to this, resulted in the creation and
implementation of the 2002 mining code. The code outlined specific provisions for order and
protections of those that work in the mining industry, as well as introducing miner permits, with
requirements on who can mine. It sets out a list of approved mining sites and requirements on
how to obtain legal mining authorisation from Ministry of Mines. The main aim of this new
legislation was to attract foreign investors into the industry and it was followed a year later by
the 2003 Mining Regulations, which sought to build upon and clarify its predecessor.
Nevertheless, the consequences to these laws have made mining by the local population more
difficult, more expensive and encouraged a large majority to go around the red tape, causing
many to criticise the 2002 Mining Code for “favouring foreign investors at the expense of the
local economy.”73
There were proposals submitted to parliament during 2015 to revise the planned mining
codes, President Joseph Kabila sought to “increase revenues from the industry by doubling taxes
and royalties for miners”74. Yet these plans were foiled later that year, as commodity prices
sharply declined and it was predicted that the new mining code would cost the country billions,
potentially doing more harm than good. Investors and many other business officials, were
worried that revising the 2002 code would be tricky, as many international investments were
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conducted on the basis of that code. The lack of government presence or regulation in these
mining regions is one of the main reasons as to why the industry has fallen into the hands militias
and armed actors. Additionally, the mineral wealth of the nation has historically been used by
political elites of the country and regional actors for generations, to enrich their personal fortune
and fund their own motives. While international advocates call for more regulation in the mining
sector, as we will see in the next chapter, it is important to first understand how the mineral trade
in Congo was established, thereby giving more clarity on how best to tackle its susceptibility to
criminalization.

Chapter 3: Criminalization of the Mining Sector

Criminalization of the mining sector in the DRC has occurred gradually over time and
has been largely aided by the very government instated to protect it. With the country in
prolonged instability throughout the 1990’s, the Congolese governmental officers were
preoccupied warding off rebels and protecting the presidency, which meant that the expansion of
the sector was generally left ungoverned. Furthermore, many top politicians and those in high
offices used their positions to use the country’s mineral wealth to satisfy their own greed. The
former dictator of Zaire Mobutu Sese Seko, accumulated enormous wealth by selling off the
country’s resources, “he sold the minerals extracted through harsh labour conditions and kept the
money for himself and his close supporters.”75 The lack of authority and rules surrounding the
industry allowed it to develop inconsistently, pushing the profession into the informal market.
The absence of regulation and the nature of the mining industry has enabled many armed groups
and regional actors to become involved in the trade of Congo’s natural resources, each pursing

75

Subrick, R.J. (2018) The Political Economy of Black Panther's Wakanda. Pp.13
46

their own motivations. This next section explores the development of the mining industry and
how it was so easily susceptible to corruption and criminalization.
When minerals were first discovered in the DRC, the colonial empire began a reign of
extraction and exploitation for personal gain, which has continued into the modern age. The
“political elite used the sale of the country’s natural resources to enrich themselves and
impoverish the rest of society”76, they got away with this by creating intricate economic networks
to funnel the money through and keeping the mining trade relatively ungoverned. Before the
Great Congo Wars started, the industry was beginning to become formalised and was largely
owned by the state-run company SOMINKI, which was a large producer of gold, diamonds and
cassiterite. Eventually production was halted during the 1990s, collapsing after the insurgency
began against Mobutu. As the war raged on, Kabila’s administration and many other
neighbouring actors traded Congo’s precious natural wealth for military assistance with their
regional allies. Congo leveraged its copper, cobalt and diamond mines for Zimbabwean support
against the Rwandan rebellion, while the RCD and Rwandan forces traded gold, coltan, tin and
diamonds to fund their operations77. The Congolese government has been notorious for using
mineral wealth as a bargaining chip with surrounding countries and foreign mining companies.
Mining was disregarded by policing thereafter, as reoccurring violence and instability began
seeping into the country. But the opaque nature of artisanal mining and the lack of transparency
surrounding trade deals, enabled shady arrangements to resume occurring at the top.
The “continuous state of conflict in the DRC benefitted armed rebels immensely” 78 and
there have been numerous claims dominating the international narrative that the Second Congo
War, which lasted between 1998-2003, was financed by mineral resource revenue. Thanks to
“economic networks that had been established … during the first years of the Congo War, mineral
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traders and military officers were perfectly placed to funnel it out of the country.”79 These
networks were often incorporated by governmental actors under the guise of instability, as it was
simpler to join them instead of setting up their own. Additionally, it was during this time that
“forces from Rwanda and Uganda, along with numerous Congolese militia groups, established
control of the production and trade in minerals throughout the Kivu provinces.”80 With the lack
of state authority governing these parts, militia groups replaced customary chiefs and soon
engaged in profiteering from the mining cycle. Rwandan and Ugandan illegal occupation of
Congolese territory, made illicit exportation an increasing problem as it became common for
surrounding countries to have a boost in mineral output, despite having questionable capacity to
mine it all.
The artisanal nature of mining minerals in the Congo is a key factor making the trade
more vulnerable to armed groups as production can be easily controlled and manipulated by using
violence. The natural resources itself are ideal for those looking to exploit it, as small quantities
yield high rewards and once mined, the origins are hard to distinguish. Especially in the case of
Coltan, there are a few tantalite deposits in Rwanda making it easy for “Rwandan-based exporters
to mix tantalite from the Congo and Rwanda and plausibly claiming that the ores all comes from
Rwanda.” 81 Due to the fluidity of the trade, mineral trade is lucrative to armed groups and
fortunately for the belligerents, a large proportion of Coltan mines are close to the international
border with Uganda and Rwanda, making smuggling a relatively untaxing task. Labour in the
mines is also fairly cheap and there are no shortage of people wanting to work, as the conflict
had rendered it one of the few remaining sources of employment left. Mining is a low skilled
operation, making miners dispensable, and therefore mistreatment and human rights abuses
towards the labourers were widespread. Additionally, as mining sites are often in remote areas
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the ores are required to be transported by hand. There is frequent exchange and transportation of
the rocks, which increases the scope for extortion.
Criminalization of the mining industry has largely occurred due to the lack of capacity of
governmental agencies to monitor and enforce safeguards for miners. Although in 1999, the
government agency SAESSCAM was created to watch over the artisanal mining industry and
improve mining condition, but they only have mandate to operate in the ZEA (authorized mining
areas) areas82. “One of the manifestations of weak state capacity and conflict in the DRC is
mining in areas where it is not permitted under law”83, therefore, as most artisanal mining is
conducted outside the ZEA areas, many state officials from various governmental factions
control access to these unsanctioned mining sites, benefitting from them by demanding unlawful
duty from local miners. The deficiency of enforceable rules on mining strategies make it easy to
corrupt and manipulate by higher authorities. While there are instances of militia men working
with local miners to provide protection, many including the Congolese Army themselves have
benefitted from the trade. The low pay of soldiers, make them more inclined to skim off the top
of mining profits and are reason enough as to why some officers continue to try and maintain
their control in mines. In militia-controlled territories, authorities stationed there can often get
away with exploiting local miners as there are weak legal systems protecting them.
The conflict and instability due to domestic and regional disputes in eastern DRC, further
aides misconduct in the sector and also conveniently provides a smokescreen for all these illegal
operations to continue thriving. The capacity of state services to oversee the artisanal mining
sector has been extremely limited, which has not only permitted criminalisation, but also created
opportunities for armed actors to profit. The state is inhibited to effectively govern due to widespread corruption, lack of jurisdiction clarification and its inability to cover the vast territory of
the Congo, lacking means, personnel, resources and technical knowledge. Armed militia’s in
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mining areas can easily access the mining routes and have typically raised money for themselves
through four distinguishable methods; theft, control of mining sites, taxation/extortion or control
of trade/smuggling routes. Theft is easy for armed groups residing near mines, as miners usually
operate individually and is a quick short-term way of making money. Moreover, as institutional
capacity is inadequate, bureaucracy and data on the trade is largely unreliable and inaccurate.
Information deficiency and discrepancy in the mineral business, makes it easier for companies
to under-report production, avoiding taxation and helps armed groups get away with pillaging
mining zones and smuggling their loot to surrounding countries. Mineral exchange and
transactions are usually conducted in the absence of written contracts making them risky, if one
party fails to uphold their end of their deal, there are often no repercussions. Controlling mining
territory or setting up road blocks along smuggling routes is another way for militias to profit,
they can control entry in and out of the mines while taxing the export of natural resources.
Uncertain land rights and unenforceable property law in the DRC, deters any resistance to the
occupation of the mining territories by these combatants and some state elites, as previously
mentioned, either turn a blind eye in return for an under-the-table pay off, or actively engage in
the unlawful exploitation themselves. Some rebel groups may also directly own or become
affiliated with certain comptoirs, enabling them to cut out the middle man, set the buying rates
of the minerals or take a cut from the final profits.
Much of the mining conducted in Congo today is largely informal and is deemed ‘illegal’.
Presently, as stated in the 2002 mining code, “artisanal mining can only take place in designated
Artisanal Mining Zones (AMZs) to be regulated and protected by the Service d’Assistance et
d’Encadrement du Small Scale Mining (SAESSCAM)”84. Nevertheless, due to high demand for
the ores and inadequate numbers of AMZ sites, much of the mining is conducted in unauthorized
areas, trespassing on land owned by industrial mining companies. These unofficial mining areas
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operate outside the sphere of influence, without any government influence and so it is easy for
human rights violations to occur under the radar and for mine conditions to be extremely poor.
Abuses such as extrajudicial killings, forced labour and child soldiers increased around rebel
controlled mining areas, also giving rise to new illegal economies such as prostitution. The
“absence of state authority in the eastern provinces reinforced the appeal of violence and deprived
local actors of established avenues for peaceful resolution of existing antagonisms”85 unaffiliated
to the war. Miners are also routinely cheated out of being offered fair prices for their loot, their
lack of collective bargaining power, access to information on global prices, as well as the ability
to determine the tantalite content of their ores, puts them a huge disadvantage, making them
susceptible to intimidation by combatants and local authorities. Moreover, the vast increase in
child labourers enticed into the mining trade when the industry boomed, signifies state failure
and a lack of governmental emphasis on education. Children who are often recruited to mining,
usually do so because they cannot attend school, either due to it being too expensive or they lack
one close enough to their homes to attend. Some desperate families may also encourage their
children to drop out of school and help make a livelihood for the rest of the family as the jobs
were available for the unskilled and wages were decent. When mineral prices and demand rose
dramatically, it also attracted many young children towards the trade as they believed it offered
better opportunities than staying in education.
As highlighted in this section, the militarization of minerals in the Congo has developed
since their vast resource wealth was first discovered under Belgian rule and has since, become
intrinsic to the growth of the industry as a whole. The issue was brought to the international
forefront as global demand for coltan skyrocketed during the early 2000s due to the IT bubble,
but the local price fell. This was a clear indication that artisanal mining was on the rise, as the
market became flooded with cheap artisanal coltan. Large international companies opted out
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from trading with industrial mines, as the artisanally mined minerals were significantly lower
priced, attracting new players seeking to profit from the illicit trade somehow. Since then, the
unpopular political governance, various regional and domestic disputes, as well as poor state
influence, have fostered a prolonged unstable climate throughout Eastern DRC. The volatility
and violence which affected the country, has in fact significantly helped the mineral trade
continue to operate informally. Legitimate trading companies have avoided establishing offices
and investing in the DRC due to fears of violence and looting, relying on intermediary traders,
despite how corrupt their operations might be. Mining heads began signing deals with rebels
instead of the Congolese government. Nevertheless, it was not long before advocates began
linking natural resource exploitation to the perpetuation and continuation of the war in Africa.
Their campaigns implicated international technology companies and western consumers as
partially complicit to the horrors unfolding in the DRC, which caused a whole revaluation and
restructuring of corporate accountability.
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Chapter 4: How ‘Conflict Minerals’ became a hot topic and its current relevance
The topic and debate surrounding conflict minerals has been very nuanced and complex
since it first hit the media limelight in the early 2000’s. The conflict and war itself has been
ongoing for the last thirty years, yet it has only recently caught worldwide attention in the last
decade or so. Throughout the 2000’s, “a global human rights advocacy movement was mobilized
to raise awareness of how certain raw materials in electronics came from mines controlled by
armed groups in eastern Congo.”86 Highlighting the link between these natural resources and
continuation of violence birthed the term, ‘conflict mineral’, which has taken over the Western
collective consciousness in recent years. Despite the relationship between armed actors and
conflict prevalent for many years before this, the awareness gained traction as consumers were
now in the firing line, but the dominant narrative also placed them uniquely at the “heart of the
solution.”87
Generally speaking, within the human rights paradigm, international concern typically
arises when there is a threat to the internal peace and security of a nation, which escalates when
conflicts have the potential of crossing borders.88 The origins of the “conflict minerals” campaign
itself can be traced back to 2001, where a panel of UN experts “recommended an immediate
embargo on the trade in minerals from the eastern DRC due to their systematic exploitation by
armed groups as a means to finance their activities”89. The subject then entered the mainstream
spotlight when the American non-governmental organization (NGO) The Enough Project,
funded by the Center for American Progress, adopted the cause in 2008 with their Raise Hope
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for Congo campaign. The organization set out to educate the public and shift attention towards
the ongoing conflict in the Congo, which had been largely absent in popular media coverage.
They focused their efforts on establishing the “role of conflict minerals funding the conflict, and
the effects of sexual violence as a weapon of war,”90 seeking to end violence by armed groups,
by tightening regulation and restrictions on the trade of tin, tungsten, coltan and gold. The
movement sought to follow in the same footsteps of the successful blood diamonds campaign,
which saw its popularity rise in 1998. NGOs often face the dilemma of whether to invest in
creating large-scale public awareness campaigns, or to strategically focus on influencing the main
policy-makers. Yet, the impact of the blood diamond initiative “suggests that public awareness
is what gives strategic policy efforts room for manoeuvre”91. Those bringing blood diamonds to
the forefront of western attention, saw really high response in public engagement following their
lead, which contributed to the swift and effective implementation of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS) five years after the issue was first discussed.
However, the global arena for justice is hugely saturated, and garnering attention towards
Congo’s minerals was initially a large struggle as competition to be the most influential
humanitarian issue of the year is tough. Unlike the blood diamonds campaign, the majority of
the 3T minerals are relatively unexciting and lack the allure and charm of precious stones.
Advocates understanding this, took an alternative approach while trying to put mineral mining
on the global agenda. They began tying natural resource exploitation to the current rising trend
in alleviating human rights issues in the region connecting the impact of coltan fever during the
1990’s to the rise of child labour in the region. In conjunction with the rising human rights
movement and drive for ethical sourcing of natural resources, international attention was then
primarily directed to stopping the widespread stories of rape and child soldiers, which dominated
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the DRC story. This also worked hand in hand with the emerging ideology originating from the
effects of globalisation, whereby there was a more prominent call by global consumers to ensure
that the products they use in their day to day lifestyle, conform to certain ethical and
environmental standards. Many of the organizations involved in campaigning about conflict
minerals were already engaged with issues affecting the Congo, and fiercely adopted the cause
once concern for the Congo grew.
As international attention and advocacy grew, more and more organisations began
conducting their own research on the ground. They uncovered a whole array of human rights
violations in cobalt mines including forced child labour, lethal health hazards and lack of
government protection for workers and illegal taxation by state officials92, which then became
the premise of the international campaigns. Children from poor families are often recruited to the
mines as they are easily exploited, often made to work long hours in conditions extremely
hazardous to their health and safety, all the while getting underpaid. Humanitarian issues
involving the exploitation of poor and vulnerable children is the perfect cause to garner
widespread international sympathy. It was easy to place this as the face of the Congo war, where
child recruitment is a common by-product of an unstable state that is unable to protect its citizens
and provide viable alternatives. Additionally, as interest peaked on the violence in Congo, the
emotional response it ignited caused attention to grow on the mining industry, the unfair
conditions of trade for the miners and its link to the west. The trade itself is conducted informally
with small marketplaces determining the going prices of each mineral daily, and therefore miners
have no option but to accept the rate despite if it is below market value.
There were four main approaches taken by advocacy efforts to place conflict minerals on
the political agenda; education, pressure, responsibility sharing and environmental appeal.
Groups sought to educate governments, consumers and companies alike about these relatively
unknown minerals and their contribution to the perpetuation of conflict in the DRC. Once
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informing the international communities about the issue, organisations were perfectly positioned
to put pressure on the same three groups to make informed and conscientious decisions, as well
as shaming governments and companies for knowingly and unknowingly trading with war
criminals. Campaign representatives directly lobbied politicians, governments and corporations.
Responsibility was shared out between these groups, persuading them revaluate their supply
chains and trading regulations, while also encouraging individual consumers to boycott or hold
electronic companies using these minerals accountable for the effects of their practices abroad.
Fourthly, some European and Australian based NGO’s, decided to tackle the environmental and
ecological consequences to ungoverned mining93. The majority of these campaigns targeted
university students and young people in Western countries, who were encouraged to petition their
campus heads and politicians to support conflict-free initiatives and laws. They achieved this by
distributing information through various multimedia outlets, engaging celebrity endorsement and
ultimately targeting young people, due to their “importance as consumers of electronic devices
and their enthusiasm for action”94.
During this conflict, there has been a rise in a new type of foreign accountability norm,
which “considers it ‘normal’ for extractive industries to be held accountable for harmful practices
abroad.”95 There has been a noticeable shift in global thinking, with responsibility being shared
amongst all the shareholders and ethical consumerism taking over. Once DRC’s plight was
adopted collectively we began discussing the cost-benefit assessment of mining, the players and
the stakeholders involved in the whole process. Companies are now being held morally,
politically and legally accountable for their activities and are being persecuted or shamed for any
connection to illegal mining activity. With the sheer amount of US celebrities and athletes all
rallying behind the cause and personally advocating for the campaigns, increased the influence
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and popular opinion towards the issue directly leading to the development of the Dodd Frank
Legislation. The widespread use of these minerals involves numerous different industries, and
with major revenue at stake, the mining industry began working with governments and NGO’s
soon after it was adopted into US law, by Obama’s administration in 2010. Coltan has now
“become symbolic of how ordinary people on the other side of the world, through their
consumption habits, are implicated in conflict and injustice”96 thousands of miles away, a
downside to globalisation.
Since Congo and its vast mineral reserves have been a topic of worldwide debate, the
changing nature of the conflict has also influenced NGO strategies, which have adapted to this
progression. During Michael Nest’s exploration on advocacy efforts governing coltan, he notes
that there is a stark lack of initiatives focusing on upstream production, that is the mining of the
mineral ores97. He justifies this by stating that NGO’s primarily “concentrate their efforts on
trying to change corporate and consumer demand because this is where [they] have the most
leverage and experience.”98 This observation uncovers a great hole in international advocacy
efforts, as they seem to be bypassing the real problem in the Congo; local cleavages, state
incapacity and including the voice of DRC miners during the formalisation process. This is a
fundamental issue in global natural resource advocacy and management, as it is common for
international efforts, while set out with good intentions, to miss the local context. Western
organizations who were tasked with research made short trips to the Congo, primarily engaging
with the government, businesses and other elites in the country. Overlooking the input of local
experts, meant that the process of state-building and formalization is disruptive and incomplete
as the whole community is not engaged. There is a noticeable gap between international efforts
and localised grassroots efforts, which undermines the formalization process. The interaction
between global and local initiatives needs to be more streamlined, in order to become more
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effective and avoid unnecessary overlap. The Enough Project realising this, broadened its efforts
in 2015 to tackle some of the underlying issues they discovered while conducting research over
the last few years. Its focus moved away from solely emphasizing on minerals, towards
understanding and strategizing to challenge the high corruption prevalent in Congolese society,
believing that this and its link to violence is the real cause of conflict.
Relevance
In many Congolese economies, “artisanal mining makes important contributions to socioeconomic development by providing employment and injecting money directly into the local
economy.”99 Henceforth a key livelihood strategy for many, demands a vigorous restructuring of
the laws and regulations surrounding it; too many people depend on natural minerals for it to be
left to its own devices and vulnerable to exploitative practices. Furthermore, with the exponential
growth of the technology industry in recent years, there is even more urgency on establishing
formal laws to govern the natural resource extraction. Each of the main minerals mined in the
DRC have individually seen their limelight and relevance peak over the last few decades, and it
appears as if now Cobalt is in the firing line.
Uniquely, the importance of cobalt has only recently become significant, due to the
electric vehicle revolution. The shift in car manufacturers towards electric vehicles (EV) has
caused the demand for cobalt to sky rocket in recent years, as has the price which “has reportedly
more than tripled in the past 18 months to more than $80,000 per metric ton”100. As of now,
cobalt is not included under the umbrella of ‘conflict minerals’, but there are calls for it to be
treated as such and predictions101 that it will soon be encompassed in the Dodd-Frank Act. But
before this comes into action, there is uncertainty surrounding the future of the law and particular
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negative consequences resulting from the US law which needs to be addressed in a local capacity
before introducing other metals to the regulation, which will be discussed in the next section.

Chapter 5: A Critical Analysis of Dodd-Frank
In recent times, the “international debate on the ongoing crisis in the East of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo has concentrated on the presumed link between the
continuation of conflict and the continuation of mineral exports.”102 Advocacy campaigns
spearheaded by the Enough Project and The Global Witness, first highlighted the link between
western consumerism and the prolonging and financing of Congo’s conflict. The campaigns
focused on technological advances which have and are developing and an exponential rate, while
also bringing up uncomfortable questions on the role of Western accountability.
The campaigns were hugely successful throughout 2009, garnering wide international
attention and soon many advocates, politicians and consumers themselves, were calling for
enforceable laws and standards to combat the violence millions of miles away. It is because of
this advocacy-led effort, the Obama administration began developing and including the notion
of ‘conflict minerals’ in their Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The
law, named one of “the most far reaching Wall Street reform in history” 103 was in part aimed to
ensure that a financial crisis like that experienced in the autumn of 2008, is never felt again. The
act sought to reform and create a more stable US financial sector, by regulating new and existing
financial firms, as well as keeping a tighter control on Wall Street, and holding them more
accountable104. Supporters of the law lobbied that it would weaken militia groups and armed
actors in the DRC as companies would have to ensure and prove that their minerals are sourced
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without any armed actor involvement. Therefore, this increased policing and attention to Congo’s
mines would be expected to eventually cut off the rebel’s revenue generated by mining, as stricter
monitoring of the minerals would be in place, limiting the potential for their profits.
Thus, the Dodd-Frank Act was born and signed into action by Obama on July 21st, 2010.
Out of its entirety, the final few pages focus on the use of conflict minerals and responsible
sourcing of them. The administration acknowledged that many minerals originating from and
being sourced in the Democratic Republic of Congo, are being exploited and “helping to finance
conflict characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo”105. The law requires US stock listed companies that use or may have reason to use
conflict minerals “necessary to the functionality or production of their goods”106, to disclose
information surrounding where their minerals are sourced from, and to make conscious efforts
to ensure that they are mined without involving armed actors or militia. The term ‘conflict
minerals’ is defined by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to encompass the 3T’s
(tin, tantalum and tungsten) and the mining of gold:
columbite-tantalite, also known as coltan (the metal ore from which
tantalum is extracted); cassiterite (the metal ore from which tin is
extracted); gold; wolframite (the metal ore from which tungsten is
extracted); or their derivatives; or any other mineral or its derivatives
determined by the Secretary of State to be financing conflict in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining country107.
The Obama administration premised the law on publicly ‘naming and shaming’
companies that use conflict minerals, believing that this would urge them to clean up their supply
chain for fear of losing global reputation and consumer loyalty. Companies implicated are
expected to file various forms and paperwork to the SEC, compile evidence to support their
‘conflict free’ claim, as well as publishing an annual ‘Conflict Minerals Report’, accessible to
the public. In order to comply with these new regulations, companies were expected to examine
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their supply chains, pin pointing the source of the various minerals and reporting their findings
publicly.
Section 1502 covers Democratic Republic of Congo and the surrounding sub-region
which presently includes the nation states of Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Congo,
Malawi, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia108. These countries are included
in the law, due to their geographical location and connection to the illegal trafficking and
plundering of the minerals sourced from Congo. Due to this broad stipulation, the law was
expected to affect a whole variety of differing industries including but not limited to technology,
electronics and communications, aerospace, automobiles, jewellery, healthcare and
manufacturing109. For the purpose of this paper, I will be explicitly focusing on the technology
and electronic industry and its role in the battle for conflict-free mineral extraction. This is
because, as mentioned in the previous section, the rise of Congo’s mineral importance goes hand
in hand with the increased worldwide technological advancement. They are becoming an
essential component of modern day technological devices and their significance is only expected
to grow in the future.
The announcement of the Dodd-Frank Act, was met with many mixed attitudes and
opinions amongst its stakeholders. Many championed the bold move, including former U.S.
Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton who praised the law saying that:
“they do bring together labor, civil society, and business to create
the broadest possible consensus behind them. This is truly the work
of a global policy network in action”110
Policy makers, business experts and advocates alike saw the SEC’s regulations as a step
in the right direction, but then the question became one of enforcement and implementation.
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Initial reservations to the law came from lobbyists and local activists, who were concerned that
the new law would in fact create a de facto ban as businesses could easily decide to boycott
Congo and source elsewhere. Moreover, with due diligence standards relatively lenient in the
past, adherence to the new law was predicted to be a very long and expensive procedure for the
U.S. businesses involved. The National Association of Manufacturers initially estimated
“compliance costs [to] fall between $9 billion and $16 billion, which are significantly higher than
the SEC estimate of $71 million.”111 Some suggested that the law would be a positive
development as it forces those profiting from mining activities to bear the costs of trade, while
also encouraging local miners and armed factions to participate in trade without violence.
Supporters viewed it as an important step in the right direction to help formalise the mining
industry of Eastern Congo.
However, despite the numerous good intentions behind Dodd-Frank, the law itself has
been proven to fall short and a little too optimistic. After its implementation in 2012, it has “set
off a chain of events that has propelled millions of miners and their families deeper into
poverty”112. There have been many accounts of unplanned negative consequences affecting local
artisanal miners on the ground, attributed to the law being based on a partial analysis of the
dynamics of conflict in Congo. The very law that was developed and implemented to protect
poor Congolese mineworkers and locals, has backfired and is in fact hindering the process of
legitimizing the entire sector. The initial announcement of the law pressured Congolese
President, Joseph Kabila, to take action in his own country to show his support and compliance
of the cause. He declared a Congolese-imposed export ban on minerals between September 2010
and March 2011, which caused detrimental effects on the local population who were ill prepared
for an embargo, let alone a self-inflicted one. Although the legislation did not explicitly call for
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an export ban, the Congolese government no doubt, felt the pressure and that they needed to
respond to show support and aid in the implementation of the law.
The repercussions from the law has had a detrimental effect on the DRC. Once the official
Congo-state led embargo was lifted, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) in the
US imposed a de facto embargo113, refusing to buy minerals from the Congo that have not been
tagged or traced114. While many support the spirit of the Dodd-Frank legislation, the subsequent
bans have caused job losses, loss of livelihood strategies and have instead benefitted select
military elites in the Kivus region. The World Bank estimates115 that before Dodd Frank,
approximately 16% of the country relied on artisanal mining in some way, after implementation
the miners were stuck with loss of jobs, no support or other alternatives. Ironically, the creuseurs
are instead now more susceptible to joining an armed group as a result116. Foreign companies
have avoided buying the minerals, leading to a drop in global price of minerals and miners lack
other options for labour and money. The Eastern provinces of DRC have been notorious for
having very little state authority or presence, which remained the case after the law came into
effect and so permitting human rights violations to continue despite this improvement.
Nicknamed ‘Loi Obama’ - Obama’s Law117 in the region, its adoption soon allowed the little to
none governance to benefit many army officials, who took over and stayed in control of the
mines. While in some areas, militia men did abandon their hold on some of the mines, in many
other areas the army seized control. They used their authority to force local diggers out of many
informal mining sites, stepping in to make money themselves by controlling and taxing miners
that extract at their location.
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The swift execution of the ban left many exporters with large amounts of mineral stock
already mined and with no way of selling. Mineral exporting did not cease, however. Officers
were able to get around the embargo by bribing, smuggling and transporting the untagged
minerals out of the country, and selling them through Rwandan and Ugandan markets, where
there was no ban. Bribery, fraud and corruption amongst the region has increased as a result of
the law, directly helping Congolese army men and some militia groups to profit. These groups
can capitalise as they have the relevant authority and networks in place to continue mining and
profiteering while the embargo was in place. “Adjoining countries also knowingly fuel[ed] the
crisis by exporting products originating within the borders of their neighbours”118, thus providing
armed groups with relatively secure transport routes and access to the global market to sell the
DRC tainted products. Paradoxically it has pushed the very trade it wished to regulate
underground, making it harder to trace and monitor. In places where militia have abandoned
mines for revenue, they have often switched to selling other commodities such as palm oil and
charcoal for income.
An array of international and local initiatives aimed at decriminalise the mining sector in
DRC were already in progress before the embargo, which we will discuss in the next chapter.
Yet, due to lack of funding from their mineral exports, they have now slowed down their efforts
and been rendered ineffective as a result of Section 1502. Another unforeseen consequence of
the ban left some remote mining areas and communities severely worse off. The majority of the
local population in these zones relied heavily on aircrafts, which routinely flew in with goods to
serve the local population and flew out with mineral exports. Without any minerals to pick up
the planes decreased in frequency, and left many areas deprived of food and goods essential for
survival. Critiques of Dodd-Frank were also quick to highlight after adoption, that the law itself
is very loose and non-binding to be truly effective. Legal definitions as stated in Section
1502(e)(4) of the Act is accused of being too narrow, in fact providing a substantial loophole for
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mining and technology companies who use cobalt instead of either of the 3TGs. Cobalt is not
included in the limited definition as it was not initially thought to be funding wars and “currently,
no country legally requires companies to publicly report on their cobalt supply chains.” 119 Yet,
the importance of cobalt has increased dramatically in the last few years and is expected to
continue rising, with special thanks to the advancement and demand of electric vehicles. Without
proper regulation expanding to include Cobalt, it is likely that exploitation and abuses concerned
with artisanal mining of the mineral will increase exponentially as predicted global demand and
price increases.
The law as of now, hinges on the punishment of a tarnished global reputation for those
companies that do not comply. There is no penalty or price facing public U.S. companies who
continue to engage in using conflict minerals, except public shaming. To remedy this, the law
could incorporate financial consequences to charge companies that fail to conform, while
enlisting the help of local nongovernmental organizations to help monitor and whistle blow on
those that continue to engage in shady activity. This would give companies more of an incentive
to conduct due diligence on their supply chains, but it is still likely to be insufficient to prevent
conflict reoccurring on the ground and allow conditions to be stable enough to establish a secure
market for minerals. Another limitation of the legislation, is that it only confronts companies at
the end of the supply chain, whereas a “coordinated pressure along the entire illicit value chain
of conflict minerals would be more effective than a standalone intervention aimed solely at the
extractive stage.”120 Governance should be streamlined across all levels of mining process, with
all stakeholders and intermediaries of the mineral supply chain from the DRC held accountable
for their actions and they should be prepared to do their part in eradicating mineral-led conflicts.
Furthermore, adherence to the current law is restricted to just U.S. public companies,
which although is a good start, is not enough to tackle such a large scale intercontinental problem.
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The Chinese mining and smelting market has somewhat capitalised on this, by offering a
substitute market during the provisional trade embargo. While this does help generate little
money for the local miners, with limited alternatives they are typically forced to accept extremely
unfair prices. The “lack of a binding global due diligence regime leaves a gap in the fight to end
the crisis”121, and all other attempts to remedy the situation is likely to fail if we do not have a
unified solution.
It is clear now, that Dodd-Frank was developed and implemented too prematurely in
response to pressures from global advocate groups, and without consulting local experts to fully
comprehend the wider implications. Many academics and experts alike complain that the
fundamental reason as to why Obama’s law has not seen the desired effects, is because it does
not tackle or even begin to tackle the underlying causes of the conflict in the DRC. While the
legislation had honourable intentions, by the time former president Obama signed the law, “the
conflict had moved into a different phase”122. Contrary to popular western beliefs, the conflict in
the Congo is largely driven by local grievances over land and ethnicity, passed down from the
colonial period. These tensions, largely neglected by the domestic and international policy
agenda, has historically held the capacity to develop into full blown war, often pulling in
involvement from regional actors. The lack of strong governance and political will by the current
Congolese president, has aided the violence as the affected regions are riddled with poor and
unenforceable rule of law. With such a large array of stakeholders, militia groups and local
authorities, each with their own agendas tangled in the mess of conflict minerals, it seems farfetched and naïve of the international community to believe that enforcing malleable laws would
be the ultimate solution. Henceforth, the international and regional dynamics of the mineral trade,
in conjunction with the known historical tensions between DRC and its neighbours, is reason
enough for there to be a more structured global strategy.
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Consequently, the continuous reality of the issue, the cost (both national and
internationally) and the challenges being faced in eastern Congo regarding its regulation, has
caused the current US government to re-consider a repeal. While Dodd-Frank has succeeded in
increasing global awareness to the humanitarian crisis and raising really topical questions about
the governance and responsibility surrounding conflict minerals, there are still few key
ingredients missing from helping to achieve its purpose. An ongoing conflict of this magnitude
and difficulty, requires a unified response both sub-regionally and internationally. Nation heads
from the neighbouring countries of Congo need to work together with the African Union (AU)
and with local NGO’s on the ground to first solve the outbreaks of violence via a bottom up
approach. There is a desperate need in eastern Congo to establish safe and secure conditions,
which can be achieved by forming strong institutions in conjunction with local authorities and
chiefs to uphold the rule of law. Only once the conditions locally, domestically and regionally
are stable, can the mining sector be expected to thrive and monitored to remain violence free.

Chapter 6: Other efforts to formalising the mining sector and tackle mining abuses
The story of Congo’s minerals has been a fairly turbulent affair, with ever changing
policies and strategies created to tackle the various stages of the supply chain. With the rise in
foreign accountability, international laws and treaties regarding conflict minerals are not the only
response to worldwide calls for more oversight in the mineral trade in the DRC. There have been
many other attempts to mitigate the impact of international corporations in poorer countries,
schemes to trace and track resources before leaving the country and international standards
enforced to reassure potential consumers that their products are conflict-free. Various bodies and
groups have rallied together and also independently, in attempts to help formalise the mining
industry in the Congo. There have been negotiations and talks between the Congolese state and
its neighbouring governments, which has led to the creation of regional bodies and initiatives
pledging to jointly tackle the governance of natural resources mined in the encompassed territory.
68

I will analyse and examine a few of these strategies in the international, regional and local
context, as well as their subsequent impact on the mining sector of the DRC.
The following tables are a collection of the past, current and ongoing laws and treaties
enacted by international, regional and domestic governments:
Table 2. International & Regional Treaties and Laws Affecting Mining and the DRC
Treaty / Law

Countries/Territories Date
Date
Affected
Created Signed

Implementation/Adoption Legally
Date in DRC
Binding?

International
Geneva Convention 196 State parties
- 1977 Additional
- 168 State Parties, 3
Protocol I and II
State Signatories

1949
- 1977

1961
-1982

1961
-2002

Yes

International
Covenant for Civil 74 Signatories, 169
and Political Rights State Parties
(ICCPR)

1966

-

1976 - Accession Date

Yes

International
Covenant for
Economic, Social,
and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)

71 Signatories, 166
State Parties

1966

-

1976 - Accession Date

Yes

Convention of the
Elimination of All
Forms of
Discrimination
Against Women
(CEDAW)

99 Signatories, 189
State Parties

1979

1980

1986 (DRC Ratified)

Yes

Convention Against
Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or 83 Signatories, 162
Degrading
State Parties
Treatment or
Punishment (CAT)

1984

-

Convention of the
Rights of the Child

1989

1990

1990 (DRC Ratified)

Yes

1978

1978

1978

Yes

140 Signatories, 196
State Parties

UNESCO 104
EX/3.3 Procedure
UNESCO members
for the Protection of
Human Rights

1996 - Accession Date
Yes
Protocol signed 2010

Section 1502 Dodd
Frank

US

2010

2010

2012 - 2017

No

Conflict Minerals
Regulation

EU

2017

2017

2021 (expected)

Yes
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Table 3. Failed Legal Attempts
Failed attempts
Treaty / Law
Bill C-486 the Conflict Minerals Act

Country Affected
Canada

Date - Dismissed
2014

Table 4. Regional Treaties and Laws Affecting Mining and the DRC
Treaty / Law

Countries/Territories Date
Date Implementation/Adoption Legally
Affected
Created Signed
Date in DRC
Binding?

Regional
The African Charter
on Human and
Peoples’ Rights
(Banjul Charter)

All 53 AU members

1987

1987

1987 (DRC joined)

Yes

Protocol to above

24 signatories, 25
unratified AU
members

1998

1999

-currently unratified

Yes

Constitutive Act of
the African Union

All 53 AU members

2000

2001

2002

Yes

Protocol to the
African Charter on
Human and Peoples'
Rights on the Rights
of Women in Africa

36 signatories, 15
unratified AU
members

2003

2003

2008

Yes

Protocol on the Fight
against the Illegal
Exploitation of
Natural Resources

ICGLR Members

2006

2006

2006

Yes

Pact on Security,
Stability and
Development in
Great Lakes Region

ICGLR Members

2006

2006

2008

Yes

Regional Initiative
against the Illegal
Exploitation of
Natural Resources
(RINR)

Members of
International
Conference of the
Great Lakes Region
(ICGLR)

2009

2010

2010

Yes

Suspension of all
artisanal Mining
Activities

DRC

2010

-

Sept 2010- March 2011

Yes

Lusaka Declaration
of the ICGLR Special
Summit to Fight
Illegal Exploitation
of Natural Resources
in the Great Lakes
Region

ICGLR Members

2010

2010

2010

Yes
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Table 5. Domestic Treaties and Laws Affecting Mining and the DRC
Countries/Territories Date
Affected
Created

Treaty / Law

Date Implementation/Adoption Legally
Signed
Date in DRC
Binding?

DRC’s Constitution:
Human Rights
Principles
• Labour & Forced
Labour Rights

DRC

1960

2006 Revised

2006

Yes

Labour Code

DRC

2002

2002

2002

Yes

Congolese Mining Code

DRC

2002

2002

2003

Yes

Mining Regulations

DRC

2003

2003

2003

Yes

The National Child Protection
Code

DRC

2009

2009

2009

Yes

Revised Mining Code 2017

DRC

2018

-

Remains unsigned by
President

Yes

•

Table 6. Organisations and Initiatives aimed at Formalising the Mining Sector in the DRC
and reducing the violence
Organisation

Initiative

Date Founded

Countries
Affected

Minerals
Included

Binding

Human Rights Watch
and Congo Research
Group

Kivu Security Tracker

2017

DRC

-

-

World Gold Council
and Jewellers
Association

Conflict-Free Gold
Standard

2012

WGC
Members

Gold

Yes

Countries
that are
“ConflictAffected
and HighRisk Areas”

3TG

Signatories
of the
Geneva
Convention

-

G8 and
ICGLR
members

3TG

China

3TG

Yes

China

-

No

China

-

No

OECD

UN

OECD and ICGLR

Implementation
- 2013
Due Diligence Guidance
for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from
Conflict-Affected and
High-Risk Areas
Guiding Principles for
Business and Human
Rights
Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)

2013

2011

2010

OECD and CCCMC

Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)

2014

CCCMC

Chinese Due Diligence
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Legal Mechanisms

International
The first wave of international liability, built upon the obligations set out in the 2011 UN
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights123 (UNGPs). These guidelines first set out the
responsibility of global companies to ensure that when the state fails or is unwilling, human rights
are respected during their operations. Companies are widely expected to warrant that their
business practices do not intentionally or unintentionally cause, contribute to, or benefit from
armed conflict or human rights abuses, yet the principles in itself are unbinding. They merely
offer clarification on the “implications of relevant provisions of existing international human
rights standards”124, deriving from states’ existing responsibilities under international law. This,
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in conjunction with the US implementation of Section 1502 prompted the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to create the ‘Due Diligence Guidance for
Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas’125 in 2013.
A practical guide detailing a five-step process on how such due diligence should be carried out
effectively. While the OECD guide is also not legally binding, it does provide direction on how
operations can be conducted in accordance with the UNGPs. It was approved by all 34 OECD
Member states, 9 non-OECD states and 11 members of the International Conference on the Great
Lakes (ICGLR)126.
In March 2013, Canada prompted by America’s legal stance against conflict minerals
began discussing introducing Bill C-486, a similar legislation to Dodd-Frank targeting the 3TGs
originating from DRC and its neighbouring countries. However, this was defeated in parliament
in 2014 and did not become law. In October 2014, the OECD signed a Memorandum of
Understanding with the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Metals, Minerals & Chemicals
Importers & Exporters127 (CCCMC), to endorse the OECD guidelines in China. The CCCMC,
in 2015 launched their own due diligence guidelines128 for responsible mineral supply chains, in
accordance with the OECD and consulting industry specialists. Additionally, the European Union
is also currently considering implementing laws requiring OECD guidance compliance for
European companies dealing with 3Ts and Gold. This is expected to come into effect in 2021.

Regional
Amidst the backdrop of Congo’s second war, reports of increased child recruitment into
the conflict, widespread rape and smuggling of natural resources to finance and prolong the war,
it was clear that there was a need for a unified approach. The cross-border complexity of the issue
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and destabilising informality of the trade, prompted the establishment of the International
Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in 2004. The ICGLR is now the “highest level
regional organisation addressing conflict minerals and security issues in eastern DRC”129 and its
members includes the African governments of Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic,
Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda
and Zambia.
The intergovernmental group signed the ‘Pact of Nairobi’ in 2006, to provide a legal
framework governing Security, Stability and Development in the region and to promote relations
between its signatories. They reconfirmed their commitment to the cause four years later, by
launching the ‘Regional Initiative against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources’ (RINR)
in 2010, to track the chain of custody of the 3TGs. Commonly referred to as the Lusaka
Declaration, the summit created a comprehensive approach to restricting the trade of illegally
mined natural resources, and financing of armed actors. The initiative not only encourages
dialogue between member states on the matter, it also sets out a set of six strategies to legalise
their certification mechanism and synchronise their independent approaches in line with other
international regulations already in place. The six tools are:
1. Regional Certification Mechanism (RCM) for cassiterite,
wolframite, coltan and gold
2. Harmonization of national legislation
3. Formalization of the artisanal mining sector
4. A regional database on mineral flows
5. Promotion of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI)
6. A whistle-blowing mechanism130
The tools are aimed at increasing transparency and implementation of the RCM requires
a close supervision and regional tracking of the minerals from mine to site of export via the
ICGLR database. This requires regular third-party audits, conducted independently of
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governments, companies and civil society. The implementation of these processes is still
undergoing relative evaluations and relevant bodies are still being established. However, progress
has been made. In 2011 a certification manual was approved and adopted by member states, and
a regional Audit Committee was founded in 2012, with the prominent heads involving
individuals from Rwanda, Kenya and the DRC. The regional certification mechanism is in place
and also, there is currently a test version of the database operating, “which has already started to
gather data on the production and exports of selected natural resources”131.
A regional strategy or harmonisation of policies and national legislations between the
Congo and its neighbouring states is an imperative foundation for a successful approach to
mitigating conflict minerals, as trade is so interwoven between the various countries that standalone approaches will not be enough. The ICGLR recognises this and openly admits that a “key
problem of this predicament is the missing linkage between the supply chain of natural resource
and the formal economy of the ICGLR Member States.”132 The regional certification mechanism
was constructed to alleviate this, it was crafted to be compatible with other available mechanisms
governing mineral resources (ITRI/iTSCI, BGR/CTC and OECD guidelines) and places each
member state liable for its implementation.
Local
Mining Code 2002 and 2003
The heightened participation of citizens in Congo’s artisanal mining industry during the
coltan boom, pushed policy makers in the country to reassess the current laws governing the
trade. With little formal and enforceable rules in place until the early 2000’s, most artisanal
mining was deemed illegal. Congo’s government then introduced a set of mining codes in 2002,
specifically aimed at legalising the trade, offering protections to those working in the industry
and outlining health and safety guidelines for safe practices. Unregulated mining was a dangerous

131
132

Icglr.org. (2018). RINR.
Icglr.org. (2018). Natural Resources.
75

trade, mines were often handcrafted and excavated by local creuseurs who were unaware of the
life-threatening dangers associated with unplanned mining tunnels and the hazardous fumes they
could be exposed to during their work. As aforementioned, the state created ‘artisanal
exploitation zones’ (AEZ’s) in areas which the site is not suited for industrial mining, enabling
ASM to be acceptable.
The 2002 Mining code was long overdue in the DRC, finally recognising and formalising
the ASM sector. The code and constitution declare that the state is the owner of all mineral
resources in the DRC, but they can grant private parties and individuals the rights to exploit the
resources. The enforcement of the code now required miners to obtain authorisation from the
state’s Ministry of Mines via a ‘carte d’exploitant artisnal’. Miners are issued permits to allow
them to continue legally mining and also outlines the permissible sites where they can continue
extracting ores. The aim was to relaunch the industrial mining sector following the two Congo
Wars of 1996-2003, opening it up to foreign investors and generating revenue for the state.
Although this was one of the first attempts to officially govern and implement rules on ASM,
enforceability was another issue in itself. The laws became adopted more like guidelines and
were rarely seen to be enforced with authority. Additionally, some of the legal aspects of the
code are at odds with local rules and competing powers, as the question of who holds the
jurisdiction is blurry. Mining agents, state authorities and local chiefs all hold some say over land
and mining activities, yet when there are conflict rights to consent, the code makes it unclear as
to who ultimately holds the power.
Consequently, in 2003 an update and revision to the former mining regulations were
introduced. Its aim was to build upon the 2002 code, by providing rules to define the legal
management of mining activities in the DRC, to offer clarification for the protections and rights
of miners as well as the role of the state. The new policies outline the parameters of mining
activities and how waste and other negative externalities from the profession can be minimised.
The updated mining regulation incorporated information on environmental standards and
76

highlighted the main administrative entities in charge of mining activities in Congo; these are the
Congolese government, Ministry of Mines and the Department in Charge of the Protection of the
Mining Environment.
While these legislations do a good job of explaining mining rights and establishing rules
for ASM, it did little to benefit the workers themselves. The quantity of approved AEZ sites were
limited and are not enough to meet current mining demands, which causes the majority of miners
to continue operating ‘illegally’. Bureaucratic red tape makes opening new AEZ sites equally as
difficult as it necessitates the approval of at least three differing bodies. The requirement of
approval for ASM employees, made it difficult for those already engaging in the trade to formally
enter the market. Usually permits and paperwork is recognised and approved only in Kinshasa,
which is time consuming and tedious for miners to travel to, as they often reside in the Eastern
provinces near secluded mining sites. Moreover, while it was necessary to establish a legal
framework to govern ASM activities, the new laws did little to combat pre-existing antagonisms
related to mining, land rights and forced displacement. Currently, artisanal and small-scale
miners have no property rights under DRC mining laws, they are only permitted to mine if they
pay a small fee to the state. Additionally, the rules do not govern mining deals already in place,
during the mineral boom many mining companies “signed ‘conventions’ with the DRC
government that exist outside of the tax and legal structure.”133
Presently, a new and updated set of mining codes are being discussed, following calls by
local NGO’s and civil society to rework the laws promoting Congolese interests. However, it is
facing strong opposition from large multinational mining corporations who are against the
proposal of a tax increase. In 2015, a set of amendments were submitted to parliament suggesting
a 5% tax increase on profits, increasing the government’s stake in new mining projects from 5%
to 10% and increasing the royalties from copper and cobalt to 3.5% from 2%134. These were
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dropped due to an unexpected decline in commodity prices, but it is feared that the financials
surrounding the natural resource will overpower the debate and urgency of more pressing
matters.
Strengthening Government Bodies and Regulating Institutions for mining oversight
In response to the expansion of the mining sector in Congo, the DRC has attempted to
create institutions and strengthen existing mandates for better oversight over the industry. The
Congo’s main mining authority is the Ministry of Mines, headed by Martin Kabwelulu as
Minister of Mines. It has the task of supervising mining activities at the national level and is
responsible for ensuring overall management of the ASM sector, with the authority to determine
AEZ sites. It has two technical services, the Technical Unit for Coordination and Planning of
Mining (CTCPM) and The Service for Assistance and Organization of Artisanal and Small-Scale
Mining (SAESSCAM) to serve ASM employees. The DRC has a number of agencies to
monitoring the mining sector:
•
•
•
•
•

National Minister of Mines
Provincial Authority of Mines
The Geology Directorate
Directorate of Mines
Department in charge of the Protection of the mining Environment

However, these lack “the necessary financial and human resources to successfully
perform its functions,”135 there is frequent unnecessary duplication and overlapping of roles
between the agencies, and also it is unclear as to the hierarchy of power amongst these various
institutions. While attempts by the Congo state to formalize the industry have been somewhat
commendable, there is constant incoordination between the various bodies leading to inefficiency
and ineffectiveness. The constant failure of these regulatory groups to work together has become
more of a hinderance to miners on the ground rather than encouraging them to conduct their
activities legally. Furthermore, the lack of funding, logistical or technical capacity of these
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structures to fulfil their mandate, fosters conditions making them vulnerable to corruption. Often
agents are underpaid making them susceptible to accepting bribes, and also, they are only
mandated to oversee the AEZ zones, despite most miners conducting their trade outside these
areas.
The biggest barrier to strengthening the mining industry is corruption and bribery, which
is rampant and encouraged throughout Congo. Historically, underhanded dealings are the way
business has been conducted for generations in the DRC, often at the hands of governmental
officers or those in high levels of authority. This poses a great conflict of interest, as individual
pursuits have typically tended to trump the needs of the citizens and elites have abused their
power for personal enrichment. Examining President Kabila’s personal assets and family links
to mining activities is a great indication of how fair and transparent natural resource governance
may not be top of the agenda for the Congolese state. Research conducted by Congo Research
Group (CRG) shows that the majority of the presidential family, including Kabila’s siblings, have
ties to over 80 companies and businesses within the Congo and overseas. 136 When elites have a
stake in various companies, it makes it easier for them to pursue their own agenda over the
nations. This is evident by the leniency shown to Kabila’s sister, which is rumored that “Congo’s
Ministry of Mines has granted a company controlled by the president’s sister, Jaynet Kabila,
more mining permits than allowed under the country’s mining code” 137. The preferential
treatment granted to those close to the President can viewed as an extension of the selective and
kleptocratic practices constructed under Mobutu’s reign to finance his personal fortune, which
has been mimicked and adopted by the elites that are now in power.
In attempts to overcome Congo’s lack of state capacity and political will, international
bodies such as the MONUSCO (Mission de l'Organisation des Nations unies pour la stabilisation
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en République démocratique du Congo), the UN’s peacekeeping mission in Congo, has sought
to implement independently controlled UN Mineral Trading Centres. Their hopes are that their
presence along key transportation routes and trading hubs, will deter any rebels seeking to profit
from the trade138, thereby breaking the link of minerals to armed violence.
Nevertheless, it is clear that thus far, the efforts made by the government of the DRC to
protect its citizens from human rights abuses is not enough. All states under international human
rights law have a responsibility to protect the world from human rights abuses, but in the Congo,
there are still not enough safeguards in place to defend artisanal miners from mining associated
health and safety risks as well as exploitation.

Industry Driven Initiatives
Due Diligence
With increased international media attention on the matter, some technology companies
and industry heads have deemed it fit to take the matter and responsibility into their own hands.
Apple Inc. has recently reported139 that it wishes to purchase cobalt straight from the source;
cutting out the middle men and buying directly from miners in Congo. This marks a huge chain
in technological company responsibility as the company previously left the purchase of cobalt to
the companies that built its batteries. If this drive has come from apple’s commitment to corporate
social responsibility is unclear, but currently in terms of cobalt supply, we “are in a supplydemand imbalance140”. There are enough resources laying underground in the DRC, but
production by artisanal miners is not enough to meet the current demand. “The iPhone maker is
one of the world’s largest end users of cobalt for the batteries in its gadgets”141, but with the rise
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of electric vehicles pending, there is a threat on global supplies. Many large car manufacturers
are hurrying to secure long-term cobalt contracts, to ensure that their supplies are maintained in
the future.
The drive for companies and industries to accept some responsibility and trace mineral
origins have largely come from their consumers. Global advocacy and campaigning has made
international consumers feel guilty about not being aware of how their spending habits can cause
inadvertent damage abroad, and therefore has altered their preferences towards goods that are
and can be proven to be more ethically sourced. In order to earn and maintain trust of their peers,
industry heads and businesses alike have strived to conduct due diligence on the origins of the
materials used in their products as well as making this information freely available to their peers.
I will now examine a few of the leading initiatives currently in place to establish honourable
mining extractive practises.
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiatives (EITI)
The need for international transparency and multi-stake holder governance within the
natural resource sector, led to the creation of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) in 2002. It “sets a standard for transparency requiring its participants to disclose revenues
generated in oil, gas and mining,”142 and is applicable to both government and company revenue
generated by payments from those in the supply chain of these respective industries, as well as
revenue received by the state from the industries themselves. The main aim of this project was
to “promote transparency, good governance, and civil society participation and accountability
within different extractive industries”143. It sought to eliminate the scope for corruption amongst
high ranking officials and strengthen faith in governance by encouraging the availability of
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information regarding the financials of the state and extractive industries. The EITI was
developed by a partnership between an array of governments, companies, NGOs, civil society
groups, investors and international organisations. The standard is upheld by an International EITI
Board and is overseen by the global civil society group ‘Publish What You Pay’, whose
campaigning had a large part in its inception.
However, the EITI is voluntary, it currently has 51 implementing member countries 144
with many countries still yet to be assessed against the newer 2016 standard. While membership
to the EITI improves global reputation and indicates a commitment to fight corruption, the
unbinding nature makes implementation difficult. The voluntary aspect means that the initiative
has a limited scope to enforce compliance from its members, easily allowing the EITI to be
undermined by governments and other stakeholders. Nevertheless, using a multi-stakeholder
governance is unique and proves to be “useful in addressing the divide between the state and
society, the state and the private sector, and the private sector and society.” 145 With trust and
legitimacy in governmental structures and authority declining in many African states, especially
in the DRC, a multi-stakeholder approach could be a solution to alleviate this and restore
confidence as it gives civil society a greater voice.
Standardization
Another instrument developed by the international community is standardization of
governments, companies and minerals, intended to remove conflict from the extraction of
minerals. The ‘Conflict-Free Gold Standard’ which was published in 2012, is a prime example
of this in the world of mineral resource management. Similar to the EITI initiative, the Gold
Standard promotes transparency within the gold industry and indicates ethical sourcing of the
materials to the worldwide consumers. It is designed to be implemented by the members of the
World Gold Council via a unified approach, and in harmony with other initiatives. Its primary
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aim is to “provide assurance that their gold has been extracted in a manner that does not cause,
support or benefit unlawful armed conflict”146 or contribute to human rights abuses, in
accordance with the OECD Due Dilligence guidelines and UN Guiding Principles for Business
and Human Rights. The standard is similar to certification in that companies applying this,
informs consumers that they conform to internationally agreed regulations and aims to increase
transparency and trust within the gold supply chain. While the standard is available to any party
involved in the extraction of gold, member companies are expected to adhere to a demanding set
of practices147 as well as report publicly on their conformance. It was developed by leading gold
miners, refiners, governments members of the supply chain, and unlike the Dodd-Frack
legislation, included African involvement. However, they have faced difficulty in the industry as
once gold is delivered to a refinery, it is often mixed with gold from all over making it challenging
to trace. This complexity, in conjunction with the fact that gold is highly valued for small
quantities, makes it susceptible to smuggling.
Certification
The use of a certification scheme in the governance of natural resources is not a new
phenomenon. Certifying products and creating a system makes it easy to translate to consumers
that the products they purchase are free from conflict and that employees are paid a fair wage. In
terms of certifying mineral-based resources, the most prominent and successful endeavour was
for the ‘blood diamond’ campaign in which saw the creation of the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS) in 2003. It was applauded as the “first and most developed statebased commodity tracking system that directly addresses the link between natural resources and
civil wars”148 underpinned by the UN mandate and backed by leading civil society organisations,
which enabled it to be discussed in the agenda of the 55th session of the UN General Assembly.
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The Kimberley Process is a traceability scheme set up to limit the flow and trade of conflict
diamonds, in conjunction with governments, industry specialists and civil society. It is a quasilegal binding import-export certification scheme which imposes a set of extensive requirements
on its 81-member countries to enable them to certify shipments of rough diamonds as ‘conflict
free’. Under the terms of the process, participating members must enact national legislation to
apply the scheme, commit to information and data transparency and exchange, as well as meet
the minimum set of requirements so their international exports of rough diamonds can be
accompanied by a KP certificate. The participants of the KP can only trade with other
participants, and implementation is overseen by Australia, who is currently the chair.
The story of conflict diamonds is similar to that of conflict minerals and therefore,
implementing a certification system similar to the KPCS, has been a topic widely discussed when
strategizing on how to tackle the emerging issue. Taking the lessons and flaws learnt from KPCS,
the narrow definitions of certification may dramatically curb the production in minerals and
instead allow broader issues such as worker exploitation and forced migration to continue
occurring. Additionally, reports by British NGO, Global Witness have characterised the KPCS
as providing a “convenient smokescreen”149 for diamond smuggling and for atrocities to
continue. The scheme allegedly authorised exports from two companies operating in Zimbabwe
in 2009, which was rumoured to kill around 200 miners in the process, causing the organization
to resign as an official observer in 2011150. The system has also faced difficulty within
enforcement as creating a credible third-party organisation to oversee all the components of a
fair-trade system and to verify worker conditions and wages has proven to be challenging.
Furthermore, the KPCS has faced criticisms in that it overlooks the role of the states involved in
the trade as it mainly focuses on non-state actor abuses. It assumes that ending the conflict is
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sufficient enough, but does little to regulate how and what undemocratic or repressive
governments do with such resources.
Traceability Schemes – Tag and bag, track and trace, finger printing.
ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi)
Mineral mining is a very informal trade and its journey from mine to being utilised in a
final product has a number of varying components to it, making criminalisation of the trade
evitable. Subsequently, this has encouraged many governments, companies and civil society
organisations to reassess the current strategies to formalising the industry in DRC and refocus
their energy on projects tackling the supply chain. The International Tin Association, formerly
the ITRI, pursued this approach in 2009 developing the ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi).
The scheme is the tin industry’s traceability and due diligence programme, aiming to avoid
financing armed conflict in the region from extraction of the 3Ts. The program uses three step
approach of overseeing the supply chain. Firstly, they trace the origins of the minerals and chain
of custody thereafter, secondly they conduct an “independent third party risk assessment of mine
sites, transportation routes, companies and the macrolevel situation to identify and manage
conflict-related risks”151, and lastly independent audits involving international and domestic
companies who have joined the scheme, and often the mines themselves.
Yet in practice, the iTSCi has faced challenges due to its geographical and logistical
difficulties when dealing with secluded mining sites, limited funding and inadequacy of local
infrastructure152. Additionally, as the programme is upstream orientated, it does not help or
benefit local ASM miners, leaving them with no other option other than accept an unfair price
for their goods, or resort to smuggling.
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BGR’s Certified Trading Chains (CTC)
Seeking to fill the void that other 3TG certification systems missed, the German Federal
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources (BGR) established the Certified Trading Chains
(CTC) scheme in 2008. They attempted to curate a scheme that works with mineral-rich
governments and incorporates broader social, environmental and labour specific issues that many
programs previously overlooked. Its main objective is to “certify responsible mining practice or
ethical production and trade of minerals,”153 emphasising process in the ASM capacity, focusing
on five core principles:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Traceability & Transparency
Labour and Working Conditions
Security
Community Development
Environmental Protection

The CTC program seeks to ensure that information on mineral origins, quantities and
payments to governments are openly available supporting the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines
mentioned above. It was first piloted in Rwanda during 2009-2011 and extended to the DRC in
2009-2016,154 working closely with national authorities in both countries as well as the ICGLR.
The BGR have also been working on an analytical fingerprint (AFP) technology since 2006,
which will provide the means for determining mineral ore origin of the 3Ts. While this cannot
be used as a stand-alone mineral traceability system, it “serves to verify the integrity, and thus
credibility”155 of tagging.
Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFS)
Another industry driven program was developed in 2009 by members of the Responsible
Business Alliance (RBA), formerly known as the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition
(EICC), and the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI). They intended to implement the
Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFS) and ensure compliance at the smelting and refining stage
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of the mineral supply chain. This part of the chain is crucial, as it is the point at which the ores
are all compiled and mixed with others mined all over the country, making the mineral origins
indistinguishable thereafter. Furthermore, it is the first point after extraction where there are
relatively few actors, enabling better oversight and regulation. Due to the development of other
mineral governance frameworks following its implementation, the CFS program was
restructured in 2017 to be more aligned with international standards such as the OECD. It was
also renamed to ‘the Responsible Minerals Assurance Process’ (RMAP) and the changes are due
to come into effects on 1 June 2018156. The organization validates conformance of smelters and
refiners via an independent third-party audit, ensuring that they meet the RMAP requirements.
Currently “more than 360 companies from seven different industries participate in the RMI
today,”157 with the RMI publishing a list of approved smelters and refiners online, as well as
providing freely available information and training tools for those wishing to become RMAP
compliant.
Summary
Since the birth of the conflict mineral campaign and increasing international pressure to
mediate, there have been numerous projects developed to tackle the governance of natural
resources, as demonstrated above. Having evaluated a few of the key initiatives and legal
mechanisms that have arisen locally, regionally and internationally, it is clear that the industry
and global market is ready to accept some responsibility. As I have explored in this section, many
stakeholders of the Congolese mineral supply chain are working on strategies to reduce ASM’s
relationship to conflict in DRC, which they feel they have perpetuated due to previous
negligence.
With the rise of foreign accountability and calls for more ethical business practices
abroad, the international community has done a good job of raising awareness and rallying
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together in attempts to help the plight of Congolese creuseurs. While a strong legal framework
to govern natural resources in DRC is greatly needed, the international laws developed thus far,
however, have seemingly fallen short. While developed with sound objectives, the Dodd-Frank
and OECD guidelines are examples of premature international mediation, that misinterpreted the
nature of the conflict in the DRC and failed to grasp the potential wider implications before
coming into effect. Additionally, these policies were largely created without the involvement of
the very people it was intended to protect, making the de facto embargo that resulted from the
law extremely detrimental to the people of eastern DRC who relied on mining as their source of
income. While local mining projects and attempts at formalisation have been ongoing in the DRC
since ASM became such a key part of the country’s livelihood, these strategies have not been
well designed or implemented, as it is missing the realities of the trade and voice of civil society.
The intercontinental legal mechanisms that were designed to negate this, instead hindered local
progress as companies began withdrawing their operations in the Congo, sourcing their minerals
elsewhere, proving that a mechanism to formalise the industry and disincentivise criminality was
required.
Certification, standardization and other traceability schemes devised by the industry and
companies in due diligence efforts, attempted to do just this; filling the gap that legal mechanisms
could not address. Seeking to create a system by which companies could prove that the minerals
they use are sourced ethically without any armed actor involvement, the various industries
embarked on various attempts at formalising and monitoring the mineral trade in Congo. While
they seem great on paper, in reality they have been seemingly difficult to separate from the
criminalization of the sector. In some cases, particularly in sites where there is little authoritative
oversight, these strategies have had the adverse effect, creating a smokescreen for illicit practices
and making smuggling more attractive. There is a strong possibility that even if a mineral is
certified conflict free, armed groups may still profit form it as bribery and extortion continue to
transpire. Furthermore, the unbinding and ostensible voluntary nature of most of these initiatives
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makes enforcement difficult, as it solely relies on a company’s good faith and fear of a tarnished
global reputation as punishment for non-compliance.
All the projects evaluated above, aim to tackle the various challenges posed by the
informal ASM sector, but it is evident that they lack interaction and connectivity amongst
themselves. It is encouraging seeing the sheer volume of organisations and intergovernmental
agencies that have arisen from the topic, yet a stronger harmonisation between the various
initiatives is required. Local voices and civil society engagement has been somewhat included,
but the attempts at governance are still very fractured. Most of the above approaches have been
initiated by a top-down strategy, yet there is a need to finance and provide resources to smaller
NGO’s and support ASM civil society groups, encouraging a more bottom-up approach. Only
these local workers will really know the lay of the land, and given the right support, will have
the potential to design and implement projects site-specific and more effectively. A dominant
challenge to this and facing formalisation of the mineral trade, is a lack of political and
institutional capacity. State weakness and absence of strong authority severely hinders the
formalisation process, as it facilitates criminalisation and permits too many loopholes. Corruption
amongst those in power, again perpetuates this, leading to a distrust in authority and disregard
for the rule of law. When analysing the many programs implemented for better mineral
governance in Congo, the complicated, informal nature of ASM makes it is clear that a stronger
and more unified local, regional, international alliance is required, paired with state-building
programs. Isolated attempts to formalise the DRC mineral industry, without local authority or
civil society involvement is futile and as illustrated will make it difficult to achieve the desired
outcome.
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Conclusion
The conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as examined in this thesis, has
proven to be a very nuanced and complex affair. It has persevered through several decades,
manipulated by various leaderships and undergone numerous shifts to those involved and its very
core. Contrary to popular belief and western advocacy efforts, it can be now determined that
while Congo’s mineral wealth once had a role in the instability, it does not currently lie at the
heart of the ongoing violence. The natural resource came to importance during Congo’s second
war, which was driven by political motivations, but the guise of insecurity enabled rebels to
maintain control and profit. Yet, despite transitioning from a war-riddled country towards peace
and democracy, instability in the region still persists. This leads me back to my original research
question; why is it that despite all the international, regional and domestic measures that have
arisen to tackle the informalisation of DRC’s mineral trade, illicit extraction and armed actor
involvement is still apparent throughout the industry? As my research has presented, there is no
singular answer. But I have uncovered an array of overarching weaknesses and limitations to
those initiatives already in place, which has hindered its overall effectiveness on the ground.
The first of which, has to do with the mislabelling of the fundamental cause of the
instability in the DRC. The “politics of natural resources were once determined by corporations
seeking profits and governments seeking taxes,”158 but this has now transitioned into an
international approach via an ethically driven framework. We have the shift in collective
consciousness and refocusing of ideology, to highlight the importance of human rights issues and
strong resource governance to thank for this increased attention on the Congo. While advocacy
efforts compiled by The Enough Project and Global Witness were effective in bringing the
mining issue in Congo to centre attention, they have been somewhat misleading and one-sided
in their approach. Having focused solely on the negative side of artisanal mining, has given policy
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makers and the global audience an incomplete picture of the real problem in the DRC and why
conflict ensues. Many years after the formal end of Congo’s war, violence and conflict is still
prevalent. The international narrative generally disregards the pockets of local hostilities due to
ethnic conflicts, land disputes and issues with jurisdiction, which have been a key source of
instability for many years. These local cleavages when left unaddressed have had the capacity to
develop into regional warfare, and continuing to neglect them will only allow them to fester and
disrupt any future peacebuilding efforts. This case causes us to revaluate the role of global
activism in pushing for policy change, as the consequential legal mechanisms and industry driven
programs developed, negatively impacted the very people it wished to protect.
Secondly, with the nuanced and multifaceted nature of the conflict in the DRC, it is now
understood that local voices were largely left out of the debate, as international actors took it
upon themselves to generate a solution. The vast majority of international and regional
approaches to formalising ASM have been developed with little to no input from the Congolese
community, which has caused them to have optimistic expectations on their adoption and
typically miss the realities of the trade. This can be especially seen with the creation and
implementation of America’s Dodd-Frank Law, which in hindsight has proven to be prematurely
executed without fully comprehending all the potential effects on DRC. The legislation is widely
criticised for its limited definition, unbinding nature and there is still a question of accountability,
as the only punishment for noncompliance is a tarnished company reputation. The tedious rules
on companies and leniency of the law, caused many of them to simply source their minerals
elsewhere creating a de facto boycott, which had severe consequences for the ill prepared
creseurs, pushing the trade deeper underground.
Furthermore, what is truly overwhelming when we look at the various strategies
implemented to tackle the formalization of Congo’s mining sector, is that the majority of them
are top-down approaches. These strategies have been moulded by governments; national,
regional, international; mining conglomerates; international electronic, technology companies;
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each with their own political agenda and set of stakeholders to answer to. This places them in a
constant conflict of interest, as in pursuing their own individual desires, the needs of the miners
and local mining communities for them are secondary. Therefore, the problem becomes not one
of “the unwillingness of the miners, but rather the inappropriateness of the policy measures to
their situations,”159 which can only be rectified if they are included in strategy development. The
existing regulations are condemned for being too narrow and technical, overlooking the broader
issues and providing very little incentives for miners and traders to join the formalisation project.
There is a complex web of socio-economic and political issues at the heart of Congo’s natural
resource sector and hence it is clear that an “externally imposed formalization process will not
work.”160 Nevertheless, due to the interconnectedness of Congo’s mineral industry, resource
governance cannot be left as a single state problem. As this paper has highlighted, Congo’s
neighbours are very much involved and complicit in the illegal smuggling of minerals. Hence, a
unified and streamlined regional response is required, with the cooperation and commitment of
the surrounding nations.
While a holistic and harmonised international, regional and domestic approach is required
for effective resource management in the DRC, there are still internal struggles which left
unconfronted will greatly obstruct their relevant success. The biggest barrier to Congo’s ASM
formalisation and other supply chain initiatives, is its own state weakness and inadequacy of its
infrastructure. The absence of a strong state authority and rule of law, has stemmed from
Mobutu’s reign, who over the years redirected the state’s resources away from public
establishments towards his personal enrichment. His leadership encouraged and fostered an air
of corruption, which seeped into many of the structures of governance and has remained there
ever since. In the most recent corruptions perceptions rankings, the DRC scored a mere 21,
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ranking 161st worldwide161. This has greatly impacted the mindset of current ruling elites and
also the political agendas pursued, as those with affiliations to natural resource companies, due
to the potential for high rewards, will have strong incentives to govern in a manner benefitting
themselves. Despite transitioning towards democracy, there is little state accountability, which
hampers the progress of the many initiatives to stop armed actor involvement in mineral
extraction. As stated by Cuvelier et al162, the illegal natural resource exploitation are generally
by-products of frail establishments, which is apparent for the case of Congo, enabling the
industry to succumb to militarisation. The ineffective governance has kept the economy weak,
vulnerable to external shocks and is its greatest barrier to growth and stability.
The purpose of this study set out to make a theoretical contribution to the studies of the
resource curse. What I have uncovered while examining the situation in the Congo is that the
curse is in fact originating from localised cleavages and aggravations, rather than the abundance
of the minerals themselves; a resource curse from below. Friction between varying ethnic groups
and clashes between chiefs for land rights are the key factors maintaining a level of violence in
the DRC. While the international, regional and domestic strategies to formalise the mineral trade
must be coherent and coordinated, they must first ensure that the climate of the DRC is stable to
guarantee their longevity. Until these grassroot disagreements are given priority and are able to
reach an understanding, peace cannot be expected to be achieved or sustained in the Congo.

Recommendations
One of the big lessons learned from all these individual initiatives is that “the linkages
between natural resources, conflict and wider governance and human rights issues should be
addressed simultaneously for a better impact and outcome”. The fragmentation of the various
initiatives in nature and applicability is evidence that a uniform strategy is required. Attempting
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to tackle all the issues separately will not be as effective, as they all remain interlinked and rely
on one another for successfulness. The various strategies currently in place to govern Congo’s
mineral wealth have largely been developed independently by international actors and industry
experts, without liaising with local specialists. They have not been as effective as required due
to poor infrastructure, lack of state capacity and political will. Drawing from the limitations to
existing approaches as uncovered by my research, this section aims to present some
recommendations for current initiatives and advice aiming to enable the DRC to be more
receptive to future endeavours on natural resource governance.

Local
Strengthen Governmental Structures
First and foremost, it is clear that the fragile institutional capacity of Congo’s government
is a great impediment to any strategy seeking to be operational in the nation. There should be
increased emphasis placed on re-establishing trust in Congo’s governance, strengthening the
current governing bodies and rule of law, with protocols in place to hold those in power
accountable. Policies and regulations are more likely to be adhered to and followed, when
members of the public have confidence that their leaders are acting in their best interest. This
could be achieved by demilitarisation of mining sites, as well as increasing governmental and
bureaucratic transparency, which is likely to restore faith in political establishments. State leaders
and governing elites should also seek to gain trust and respect from their constituents, which
could be achieved by declaring or passing laws requiring them to relinquishing their affiliations
to the mining sector, demonstrating that there are no longer ulterior motives in policy discussions.
The present institutions in the DRC are not equipped to handle and enforce the law
effectively throughout the entire country, therefore smaller branches of authority predominantly
scattered throughout mining areas would be beneficial in restoring order and discouraging illicit
trading of minerals. In order for these to be respected and effective, corruptive practices such as
94

bribes should be closely monitored and punished. Reliable and trustworthy groups of authority
with high regard for the rule of law, should be positioned along key trade routes and along the
border to deter any smuggling or rebel involvement in mining activities.
Address root causes of instability
The Congolese government should also divert resources to understanding and remedying
the underlying causes of instability, which has historically been overlooked. Establishing
provincial organisations or working with local NGO’s to promote community engagement and
peacebuilding campaigns to alleviate ethnic tensions, especially between the Banyarwanda and
Hunde groups, could be one way to lower hostilities in the local environment. Additionally, land
rights and territorial distinctions should be carefully examined and appropriated in conjunction
with local chiefs and settlements. Land is extremely valuable and important in Congo, and
therefore it should be delicately negotiated and divided, as to avoid future disagreements.
Empower Miners
ASM is a highly vulnerable trade and therefore, there is a need for more miner protections
and safeguards to be implemented. As Greenen notes, “formalization risks to confirm and
reinforce the rights of the stronger parties”163, which stresses the need for unionization of the
miners themselves in order to collectively defend their own rights, bargain for policy changes
and have representation in policy discussions. Information sharing and granting free access to
daily mineral prices and mineral ore content will help miners from being taken advantage of and
should guarantee that they receive fair prices for their commodities.
Revaluate and implement strategies with local input
In the context of mining regulation, Kabila’s administration should revise the mining
codes to reflect the evolving realities. As aforementioned, the authorities should create more ZEA
mining zones and form multiple smaller branches of the relevant bodies closer to the mineral
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deposits, regulating the informal and unauthorised sites, as well as making it easier for miners to
obtain required permits and information. This would help establish some support to the local
creuseurs and allows state oversight which should protect miners from environmental dangers
and deter child labour. To tackle child labour, the state has an obligation to make education free,
compulsory and easily accessible, which will limit the volume of children available to mine.
Moreover, there should be investment made in developing other alternative livelihood methods,
to avoid overmining, economic dependency on its natural resource and offer diversification.
A strong foundation, increased faith and respect in governing institutions are the
minimum requirements in the local context for any further policies to be effective. While regional
and international mediation in ASM could be advantageous, domestic and local capacity needs
to first be expanded, intensified and supported.
Regional
Harmonisation of laws and creation of a regional oversight committee
The mineral market and trade is not confined just to the DRC, as the porous borders
allows many of the surrounding nations to actively participate and profit from the sale of Congo’s
resources. This is why in order to be effectual, the “multifaceted crisis in the DRC requires
coordination within the region”164. Harmonisation of the laws and stipulations across the great
lakes region is pivotal for governing success, as it makes it clear that the countries involved are
all committed to stopping illegal trade and are responsible to enforce the appropriate measures
within their own borders. An alliance and streamlined approach, makes coordination easier and
should be reinforced with a regional oversight committee separate from each nation’s
government, which can facilitate intercontinental dialogue, synchronisation, evaluate and hold
accountable each member’s strategy implementation.
International
Support Congo’s governing structures
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While restructuring and strengthening Congo’s public institutions are a domestic issue,
international pressure could be strategically placed on Congo’s current governing elites to
execute these. International organisations and donors need to be more aware and responsible for
their donations and how it impacts the Congo state. They need ensure that strategies do not make
the country reliant on their aid and encourage the state to put its citizens above political and
personal motivations. A possible method of ensuring this could be to make political aid
contingent on political reforms, with regular outside audits on fulfilment. Donor institutions
could also use their influence to help more legitimate and responsible leaders rise to the top and
be trusted to take control of state resources for greater good.
Collaborate with local NGO’s and grassroots organisations to develop enforceable
traceability mechanisms
The international community and various industries with operations in the DRC have
been very effective in assuming responsibility on their practices abroad. They have adopted
strategies that holds them morally, political and legally accountable and have sought to develop
ways in which their activities can be ethically conducted. In response to this, there has been
increased focus on establishing supply-side due diligence and tracing schemes for the 3TGs, yet
they have been mainly conducted without the input of local knowledge. As a result, the laws and
various formalising initiatives have generally followed a top-down approach and failed at cutting
off armed involvement, subjecting the nation to an array of unintended negative consequences.
From my research, it seems evident that these foreign projects would benefit from collaborating
with local NGO’s and grassroots organisations to create more bottom-up management schemes.
Partnering with local specialists not only would benefit the local economy, but it would also
allow global actors to gain valuable insight into the truths of the trade, generating a more targeted
operational response.
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Evaluate and reorient current legislations and initiatives
The current legislations and initiatives are widely criticised for being too narrow which
has impacted its overall value. While there are current talks of amendments and repeals to these,
the laws are limited in its application and scope. Since Dodd Frank’s creation, the importance of
cobalt has risen dramatically and hence there is a need for it to be included as a conflict mineral.
Furthermore, the due diligence mechanisms are nonbinding and based mainly on the company’s
fear of receiving a tainted status. This in itself is not enough to influence businesses into action
and to drastically change or alter their operations towards a more ethical framework. There is a
need for credible sanctions and financial punishments for non-compliance, which will create
incentives for following the rules.

Concluding Remarks
The issue of conflict minerals is multidimensional and highly intricate and therefore, a
nuanced approach is best required to alleviate some of the local struggles. Due to the multiple
interacting factors and actors, a multi-stakeholder approach and a process that engages
surrounding governments, industry, civil society and the international bodies such as the UN is
strongly required. With the huge advancement of technological development over the last few
years, the exponential rise in demand for electric cars and the growth in demand for ethically
sourced products, it is clear that Congo’s mining industry is only going to grow in its importance.
It is therefore imperative that policy makers acknowledge the complexity surrounding Congo’s
ASM and work to include equal representation of all relevant parties in future strategy
development. Congo’s mineral wealth can and should be harnessed for the good of the nation,
not treated like a curse.
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